Gentleman=s Agreement:
The Antisemitic Origins of Restrictions on Stockholder Litigation
by
Lawrence E Mitchell*
In March, 1944, within a period of two days, only two weeks after its introduction in the
New York State Legislature, the legislature passed, and Governor Dewey signed, a bill that became
section 61-b (now section 627) of the New York Business Corporations Law. The statute created a
right for a corporation, sued derivatively by one or more stockholders who owned less than
$50,000 in value or 5% of its outstanding stock, to demand that the plaintiffs post a bond as
security for the corporation=s expenses, including attorneys fees. 1The first of its kind, similar
statutes now exist in nineteen states. Almost every state has some form of statute restricting the
standing of derivative suit plaintiffs.2
It=s certainly not unusual for a state legislature to pass a statute; that=s what they do. But
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Section 61-b had a highly unusual birth. Most New York legislation originated either within the
legislature, the New York Law Revision Commission, or the Judicial Council of the State of New
York. In this case, none of these were even involved, and none of them were asked for their
opinions.3 Moreover, the statute seems to have been opposed by all of the major bar organizations
of New York City, including Athe Committee on State Legislation of the New York County
Lawyers= Association, the Federal Bar Association of New York, New Jersey and Connecticut, and
the Law Reform Committee of the New York City Chapter of the National Lawyers= Guild.@4 No
hearings were held, and debate was minimal. Lawyers and judges at the time pretty much
universally recognized, for reasons that shall become clear, that the statute effectively eliminated
derivative suits by making them far too expensive for a plaintiff to maintain.5
Where did Section 61-b come from? It was the gift of the New York Chamber of
Commerce, an organization of businessmen which had no governmental authority. Quoting from
Forbes Magazine, Zlinkoff reports that A>The New York State Chamber of Commerce . . . is not in
fact a state chamber at all and is indeed entirely different from most chambers of commerce. It is
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strictly a New York organization composed very largely of extremely conservative corporation and
financial interests of that City.=@ 6 One year prior to the bill=s introduction in the legislature, the
Chamber of Commerce had commissioned a report that purported to study the abuses of derivative
actions and to recommend reform. The report was only released simultaneously with that
introduction.
One might applaud a policy that restricted stockholder litigation to those stockholders who
demonstrably had a significant financial interest in the corporation. It is, after all, a way of
deterring unworthy suits. One might also take the same attitude towards Justice Rehnquist=s only
securities law opinion in his thirty years on the Supreme Court, the 1975 Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores7, which in a different way imposed important limitations on the ability of
plaintiffs to sue corporations for securities fraud and began three decades of Supreme Court
jurisprudence that imposed increasingly tight restrictions on plaintiffs. And one might even
approach with a similar perspective the so-called Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 8,
which grew out of the ill-conceived Contract with America and which has created the embarrassing
situation for an irate Congress that it may well make it difficult for Enron stockholders to recover
their losses.
One might approach these restrictions with this attitude. One might see them as a
legitimate attempt to protect an otherwise helpless corporate America from the pernicious threat of
greedy plaintiffs= lawyers who promiscuously file lawsuits and in so doing damage stockholder
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interests, interfere with corporate efficiency, and embarrass and discourage innocent directors and
officers. And in an age in which a small handful of very wealthy plaintiffs= firms seem to form a
litigation cartel, one might have a point.9
But there=s a different perspective from which one could approach these doctrinal
developments, and it doesn=t take a lot of evidence to demonstrate its potency. The 1944 Act was, I
shall argue, adopted as a proximate (but almost certainly not the sole proximate) result of deeply
ingrained antisemitism in the New York bar and corporate world, antisemitism which not only
colored their approach to these issues but created the very structural conditions which made the
argument supporting the statute seem persuasive.10 While hardly a monocausal explanation for the
statute or the attitude towards stockholder suits that motivated it (strike suits do, after all, occur), it
is at a minimum the template upon which these restrictions were built. It is a particularly urban and
eastern form of antisemitism whose attitude and structural consequences demonstrably persisted
well into the 1960s. There even are hints that it lurked behind Rehnquist=s rhetoric in Blue Chip
Stamps (rhetoric found nowhere in the briefs). And that ingrained, if no longer easily visible,
antisemitism, animates our contemporary attitude toward stockholder suits and plaintiff=s lawyers,
an attitude that motivated the passage of the 1995 Act. It continues to poison the way we think
about stockholder suits today.
One doesn=t have to look far for the evidence. In fact the very genesis of this Article is the
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tone of judicial opinions that have applied the security-for -expense statute, as well as the tone of
opinions like Blue Chip Stamps. It=s a troubling tone that has led me to examine the substantial
empirical data that exist with respect to the New York bar in the middle of the twentieth century. It
is the tone of the critical (and deeply methodologically flawed) New York Chamber of Commerce
Report (the AWood Report@)11 that served as the argument in favor of the legislation. It is a tone of
contempt and suspicion. And while it is impossible for me to prove causation directly, since there
is no smoking gun that reveals antisemitism as a driving cause of the statute, the circumstantial
evidence demonstrates that this in fact is the case.
Interesting as an historical matter, you might say, and not surprising either. But we=re past
that now. Antisemitism in the bar, while to some extent still extant, is mostly ancient history. We
can evaluate these and other restrictions on stockholder suits purely on a policy basis. You might
say that. But you=d be wrong, because we don=t. The pervasive negative attitude towards
stockholder suits, whether derivative or class action, continues irrationally to poison our attitudes
towards plaintiffs= lawyers and their role in our corporate system. To read the legislative history of
a statute like the 1995 Act is to see that its passage was a function of attitude and lobbying B no
significant empirical data is cited to support its conclusions.12 And its burden fell unequally, almost
exclusively on eastern, urban Jewish lawyers.
As recent events from Enron to WorldCom continue to show, the trust in corporate
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America and the concomitant distrust of the corporate plaintiffs= bar that are implicit in the rules
are unjustifiable. These attitudes and the laws they engender are the relics of antisemitism, and
they are attitudes which have increasingly led courts and legislatures to let corporate managers off
the hook. Even modern finance theory, upon which I=ll briefly touch in Part I, illogically and
inconsistently fails to treat stockholder suits in the same manner as other nonsystematic risks.
Recognizing this should lead us to rethink our attitudes toward stockholder litigation and the laws
and policies with which we regulate it. It should make us more attentive to the benefits of this
litigation, as well as the recognized costs it imposes, and lead to empirical work evaluating the
actual effect that stockholder litigation has on our corporate wealth. Most of all, it should make us
stop to examine our attitudes and test them against the world as we know it, not against a world
tainted with racism and bigotry.
In Part I, I will take a few pages to show how portfolio theory logically ought to make us
relatively unconcerned with stockholder suits, a concern that is so great that it amounted to a
virtual witch-hunt (including a congressional override of President Clinton=s veto) in Congress=
passage of the 1995 Act. In Part II, I will describe the structure of the New York bar from the
1930s through the 1960s, drawing on the rich empirical and sociological evidence available. Part
III will examine the law restricting stockholder suits and analyze and criticize its contemporaneous
justification. In so doing, I will connect this law to the data in Part II in order to demonstrate
circumstantially (which is the only way one can demonstrate such things) the original and
persistent antisemitic roots of the doctrine. I will conclude by linking this history to the 1995 Act.
I want to be clear that at no point in this article will I analyze the wisdom of the restrictive
stockholder suits B it certainly doesn=t examine the benefits.)
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policies themselves B that has been amply done by others. My argument is more narrow, and at the
same time more broad. It is, in short, that whenever we confront issues regarding stockholder
litigation, as Congress did in 1995, we must do so aware of the fact that our overwhelmingly
negative attitude towards such lawsuits is rooted in an ugly legacy of antisemitism, an
understanding that should make us more cautious in restricting stockholder litigation and more
attentive to hard, empirical data.
I. Finance Theory Supports Stockholder Litigation For the Same Reasons it Supports
Diversified Portfolios
I said I wasn=t going to debate the merits of restrictions on stockholder suits, and I=m not.
But I do want to start by using modern finance theory to demonstrate the irrationality of the
opposition (or at least to demonstrate the purely ideological nature of the opposition) to
stockholder litigation, an irrationality (or ideology) that lurks in that most rational of disciplines.
Modern finance theory tells us (as Enron pensioners evidently learned the hard way) that the best
investment strategy for any investor, and the best way for an investor to protect herself, is to
diversify her portfolio. Holding different baskets of securities instead of putting your eggs all in
one means that if one of your portfolio corporations does poorly, it will likely be offset by superior
performance by another. Or, to shift metaphors, if you bet the farm and lose, you lose the farm. So
instead of betting the farm, you bet a larger number of truck gardens.
So powerful is this theory that it actually has served as the basis for relaxing managerial
fiduciary duties. Why should we protect investors (and in the process perhaps stifle valuable risktaking) when investors can protect themselves, or so the argument goes? Of course courts
recognize that their laxity not only allows for greater risk-taking but provides greater latitude for
7

misconduct, but as long as misconduct isn=t the order of the day, a little unredressed misconduct
won=t hurt the investor with a well-diversified portfolio.13
There is something to commend this approach. In my view, there is more to criticize. But
that=s beside the point. The relevance of the point to my argument becomes clear when you look at
the arguments of those who advocate diluting managerial duties and restricting stockholder suits.
Their argument is that meretricious stockholder suits (which on this view is the vast
majority of them) interfere with business and sometimes cost the stockholders large sums of money
in settlement payments and legal fees just to get rid of vexatious litigation.14 (Of course the
assumption that most stockholder suits are meretricious is based on the very prejudice we=ll be
tracing throughout this article.) Let=s assume that at least some substantial number of these suits
are without real merit, or of trivial value. If there is any value to stockholder litigation, and there
clearly is, as the sole legal means of enforcing internal corporate governance and as a valuable
supplement to limited federal resources in enforcing the securities laws, then the fact that some
individual corporations may be unfairly harmed is just the other side of portfolio theory, at least
from a utilitarian standpoint. That is to say, it is well recognized that stockholder plaintiffs and
their lawyers supplement the very limited enforcement resources of the Securities and Exchange
Commission in the role of a kind of private attorney general. And this does have real benefit
because, left to the Commission alone, much wrongdoing would go unredressed, and the very
knowledge that the Commission was the only enforcement authority would create an atmosphere in
13
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which potential wrongdoers could make cost -benefit decisions based upon the (unlikely)
probability of getting caught.15 Vigorous stockholder litigation helps to keep corporate managers,
and our entire corporate capitalist system, honest.
If this is true (and I think pretty much everyone would accept it as true on some level), then
the losses incurred by the wrongly- sued corporation (including money paid both in legitimate
settlements and pay-offs) are made up for by the diminution in fraud and bad conduct caused by a
more potent enforcement regime in which stockholder suits are more easily brought. In other
words, an individual corporation (like an individual= s investment in a particular corporation) might
suffer, but overall social welfare is higher because corporate conduct is kept at a higher level. It
also stands to reason that if corporate conduct overall were lowered, stock prices would generally
be lower to discount for the greater likelihood that corporate managers would misbehave, and thus
produce a deadweight loss.16 So, despite the fact that it has been used only to restrict managerial
duties and stockholder litigation, portfolio theory actually justifies a vigorous private enforcement
regime with the same power it does the relaxation of managerial duties
Portfolio theory, applied directly, ought to be dismissive of the losses that corporate
stockholders suffer due to groundless litigation, at least until those losses exceed the value of
enforcement. In light of the fact that Enron alone, in the space of a couple of months, lost
approximately $60 billion in market capitalization (shareholder value)17, and in light of the further
15
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dramatic stock price drops occurring through July 2002 (the time of this writing) due to
corporations revisiting their financial statements (which is another way of saying that they are
correcting their frauds or at least their overreaching), it does seem that there would have to be an
extraordinarily large number of meretricious stockholder suits with very large settlements (usually
not the case) in order to lead to the conclusion that stockholder suits ought, as an objective matter,
to be severely limited. And if this is the case, then portfolio theory tells us that a well-diversified
stockholder should suffer no greater harm from a portfolio company=s settlement of an unjustified
suit than she should from managerial mismanagement and theft.18 The argument seems so obvious
as to be almost not worth making. But nobody has made it.
Why not? Why wasn=t this as obvious to the scholars applying portfolio theory to argue in
favor of deregulation as were the virtues of a diversified portfolio? Among a number of possible
reasons is that we remain blinded by the prejudice against stockholder plaintiffs and their lawyers
sown in the 1930s and >40s and embedded in the earlier restrictions on stockholder litigation and its
reasoning. We don=t see it because we have internalized an ideology arising from bigotry and
prejudice.19 Once we recognize this, we can perhaps more objectively balance the value of
stockholder litigation with the desire to discourage meretricious lawsuits.
Having seen, as a theoretical matter, the obvious financial merit of stockholder litigation to
a vigorous market, I will now turn to the central point of this Article, the very reason why we fail to
18
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see the merit of stockholder suits.
II. Jews Without Money20
In 2002 it might be hard to imagine a time in America not only when antisemitism was
widespread and virulent but, given the singular success of Jews in America, it may be even harder
to imagine a time when the vast majority of American Jews lived in dire, grinding poverty, when
substantial numbers of children were orphaned or had only one parent, when children not yet
teenagers worked twelve hour days or more in horrible sweatshop conditions, when overcrowded
and dangerous tenements and the unbearable stench of the Lower East Side of New York made it
difficult for parents to imagine that their children or grandchildren would inhabit executive suites,
Wall Street law firms, or Park Avenue medical offices; that they would acquire high political
position, and so many other fruits of the American dream. But this was the condition of the
average American Jew in the period of highest immigration from central and eastern Europe, 1880
to 1920, and for some time after.21
At the same time, there was a Jewish elite in America that had begun to establish itself in
the 1840s and was firmly ensconced in the highest reaches of business and banking, and even
politics, by the beginning of the flood of eastern migration.22 This group, with names that still
adorn our financial and cultural institutions like Lehman, Lewisohn, Schiff, Goldman,
20
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Guggenheim, Sachs, Kuhn, Loeb, Warburg, Seligman, and many other lesser-known yet still
prominent families, were largely accepted into non-Jewish circles, both professionally and B within
limits B socially.23 Their origin was Germany, where the Haskalah, or Jewish enlightenment, led
by philosophers such as Moses Mendelssohn, encouraged Jews to throw off the trappings of
orthodoxy and assimilate into Protestant German society on the debatable grounds of modernity.
(Mendelssohn=s own son converted to Lutheranism, though his grandson, the famous composer
Felix, maintained a Jewish cultural identity.) The elite of this group had little trouble assimilating
into Protestant American society, for the cultural norms and practices which separated them were
few, and their socio-economic status became quite similar.24 Many even intermarried within the
Protestant elite, and some even converted.25 Most were Republican, at least until the late 1920s.26
It is undeniably true that even this elite class of relatively assimilated Jews were still subjected to
some suspicion and hostility, as Edith Wharton novels27, the antisemitic ravings of the otherwise
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brilliant Henry Adams28, and the numerous stories of slights told by as accepted a Jew as Bernard
Baruch illustrate.29 But most were sufficiently accepted to be willing to put the occasional slight
aside.30
It wasn=t until the mass migration of eastern Jews, following the death in 1881 of the
relatively liberal Czar Alexander II and the ascension of his son, accompanied by horrific pogroms
and the release of pent-up antisemitism among both the Russian elite and the liberated serfs, that
American antisemitism on a widescale basis began to manifest itself. Even then, it was largely
directed at the new, stranger, immigrants from the east, who had retained their orthodoxy and had
been consigned in the Pale of Settlement to dire poverty, immigrants who arrived poor, dirty,
bearing the physical trappings of their religion, and speaking the odd patois of Yiddish. Again the
story is well known that while their Americanized German brethren eventually provided charity
and other forms of help, they too were somewhat repelled by their distant cousins and, in the timeworn tradition of immigrant Jews everywhere, were concerned that these new, impoverished,
unassimilated immigrants would embarrass them by association.31 ANative@ Americans viewed
these immigrants with even more suspicion and outright hostility, and even other immigrant groups
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like Italians and Irish B subjected to prejudice themselves B were concerned that these Jews, who
would work for virtually anything, would take their jobs, which led to violence (particularly among
Irish immigrants and their descendants) toward Jews.32
This is the situation that persisted largely up to the 1920s and grew with increasing fervor
until its peak B oddly enough B during World War II, a period to which Leonard Dinnerstein refers
as the Ahigh tide@ of antisemitism in America.33 This of course was the period during which
section 61-b was conceived and enacted. It was a time when the America First Committee, formed
to keep the United States out of the war, attracted as its leaders Henry Ford and Father Coughlin,
men who previously had established famously antisemitic reputations. Leaders of this committee
insisted that the Roosevelts and A90 percent of the New Dealers@ were Jewish, that Jews were in
control of the federal government, and that Hollywood producers (who were of course Jewish)
were making movies designed to lead America into war (and which accusation led to a Senate
investigation into Hollywood). It was a time when Charles Lindbergh, fresh from receiving a
medal from his hero, Hitler, spoke against the Jews who controlled the press, the media,
Hollywood, and the federal government. While Lindbergh was so heavily criticized that the
America First Committee virtually disappeared, antisemitism during this period continued to
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increase.34 Dinnerstein quotes Jewish actor Kirk Douglas, who easily Apassed@, as saying during
this period: A>the things that in their nightmares Jews speculate non-Jews say . . . I found out they
do.=@35
Regularly kept polling data demonstrate increasing antisemitism during this period.36 In
May 1938, 36 percent of respondents agreed that Jews had too much power in America; by 1945
(when Hitler had essentially annihilated European Jewry and the Jewish migration to America had
long been stemmed by the federal government) that number had risen to 58 percent.37 When
Charles Lindbergh made his famous Des Moines speech in 1941 on behalf of the America First
Committee, he named three groups he believed were drawing America into the war; Jews, the
Roosevelt administration, and pro-British groups. In a survey conducted later that year, 40%
remembered the accusation against Jews compared with 31% as to the Roosevelt administration
and 21% as to pro-British groups.38 This leaves the distinct impression that antisemitism had by
then become a significant part of the American consciousness. And despite this fairly widespread
belief that Jews were agitating to involve America in the war, once the war had begun at least onethird of the American population believed that Jews were less willing to serve in the armed forces

34
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and less patriotic than even German and Japanese Americans.39 In June 1944, 24 percent of survey
respondents identified Jews as the greatest menace to Americans, with only 9 percent identifying
Japanese and 6 percent identifying Germans C and this almost a full year before the European war
had ended and during a time when Jewry had virtually been wiped out in Europe.40
Antisemitism simply was pervasive throughout America during this era, the era of the
Wood Report. Dinnerstein notes a 1942 poll asking high school students who would be their last
choice as roommates. The only double-digit negatives were, unsurprisingly, African -Americans at
78%, and Jews at 45%. A similar report by Fortune contemporaneously with this study asked
factory workers who they would least like to have move into their neighborhoods and this time
African-Americans and Jews were joined by the Chinese (who interestingly scored only 9% on the
student survey) with 72%, 42% and 28%, respectively. 41 Finally, a poll asking the respondent
whether he or she had heard any negative comments of Jews during the preceding six months led to
46 percent affirmative and 52 percent negative responses in 1940, growing steadily to 64 percent
affirmative and 34 percent negative in 1946, a year after the war ended and the reality of the
Holocaust had been widely reported.42
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Nativism and general anti-immigrant sentiment, as well as class and economic conflict,
added to the cruder and more virulent forms of antisemitism. But despite its popular peak in the
1940s, it had already become deeply embedded in the consciousness of the eastern, urban,
Protestant elite, that very group that had accepted the German Jews into their numbers. As Digby
Baltzell so convincingly reports, it was the relatively quick transformation of mass Jewish poverty
into Jewish economic success that led antisemitic attitudes within the Protestant elite to become
more ingrained.43 From their hegemony in the 1920s, referred to by Baltzell as AThe Anglo-Saxon
Decade@, by the 1940s WASPS had already begun to withdraw significantly from the public arena,
defeated by the liberalism of the New Deal, their loss of their power in Washington, and the
booming economic success of immigrant groups.44 What had principally been for them a matter of
class (although I don=t mean for a moment to dismiss their latent - and sometimes blatant B racial
antisemitism)45, now became a matter of caste, as their increasing loss of power to Jews led to their

interested reader to other sources. See e.g., Steven Alan Carr, HOLLYWOOD AND ANTISEMITISM: A CULTURAL
HISTORY UP TO WORLD WAR II (2001), ANTISEMITISM IN AMERICA TODAY: OUTSPOKEN EXPERTS EXPLODE THE
MYTHS (Jerome A. Chanes, ed., 1995), Roberts S. Wistrich, ANTISEMITISM: THE LONGEST HATRED (1991).
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E. Digby Baltzell, THE PROTESTANT ESTABLISHMENT: ARISTOCRACY AND CASTE IN AMERICA (1964). This
book, in which Baltzell, who is credited (evidently wrongly) with coining the acronym AWASP@, spends more time on
antisemitism than any other social attitude of the WASP elite, arguing that antisemitism largely defined the WASP
caste. See Eric Pace, E. Digby Baltzell Dies at 80; Studied WASPs; The New York Times, August 20, 1996, Sec. B, p.
6 (in which Baltzell=s widow is quoted as saying that he was wrongly credited with coining the term).
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Such withdrawal in the face of adversity characterized the predecessors of the WASP caste in the Gilded
Age, as so wonderfully detailed in the whinings of Henry Adams. See THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS (Ernest
Samuels, ed.).; Baltzell, supra note __ at 112-13.
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One might be tempted to think that the story I tell is one based on class rather than antisemitism. I shall do
my best to demonstrate otherwise infra note __ . As to the racist aspects of antisemitism, it does appear that the easier
social acceptance of German Jews in contrast to Eastern European Jews supports antisemitism as a hybrid form of
racism. For an argument suggesting the grounding of at least some strain of American antisemitism in racism, see
Jack Wartheimer, Antisemitism in the United States: A Historical Perspective, in ANTISEMITISM IN AMERICA TODAY,
supra note __ at 33, 46. Bendersky, supra note __, comes down clearly on the side of biology and race in explaining
military antisemitism, with frightening echoes of Nazi ideology.
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retreat into private and exclusive clubs, resorts, suburban enclaves like Bronxville and Tuxedo
Park, and the closed urban society of the Upper East Side. In so doing, they ultimately
relinquished the role of ruling aristocracy for the more comfortable and less challenging role of
social elite. As they saw their power wane, they - the heirs of the colleagues of nineteenth century
German Jewish financiers B fully internalized the antisemitic stance that had become pervasive
throughout America.46 Clubs and exclusive neighborhoods, not to mention exclusive social circles,
provided safety and affirmation. As in the face of the Progressive onslaught during the Gilded Age,
the A>decent people=@, as Baltzell quotes Edith Wharton as saying, A>fell back on sport and
culture.=@47
Yet the new class of immigrant Jews was improving its lot through hard work and
education. In fact this was precisely why antisemitism among the Protestant elite became so
pervasive. Certain kinds of businesses remained relatively open,48 perhaps because commercial
transactions didn=t require the sustained contact that other kinds of businesses requiring more social
interaction did. But the professions were different, and the state of the bar, especially in New York,
is illustrative of the severe limitations on Jewish advancement within the elite ranks of the legal
profession, limitations which persisted at least through the 1960s. Jews were excluded from much
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Baltzell, supra note __; Dinnerstein, supra note __ at Chapter 7.

It=s interesting to note some of the parallels between the behavior of the WASP aristocracy and
nonslaveholding Southern whites in the ante-bellum period. In each case, the existence of a lower class facilitated the
maintenance of caste, regardless of personal or individual economic achievement.
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Baltzell, supra note __ at 113.
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Principally in the soft-goods and retail trades, and of course entertainment. Heavy manufacturing,
commercial banking, finance, transportation, and insurance were still the province of the WASP elite. Baltzell, supra
note __ at 207-8.
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of industry, engineering and, for the most part, medicine, and while not from law, certainly from
the elite corporate bar. Instead, they turned to other forms of legal practice, including challenging
those corporations through derivative litigation, in order to make a living. In so doing, they refused
quietly to accept their second class status and strived for economic success in the only ways
available to them. In so doing, they hit the Protestant elite, which controlled American industry
and the corporate bar, exactly where it lived.
In presenting the evidence, I will rely as nearly as possible on the extant statistical data.
Although there is a plethora of narrative description (on which I must and will rely to some extent),
it is far too easy in a study like this to rely upon horror stories and rhetorical flourishes to make the
point. Thus, while I might be dry, I shall try to rely on available data rather than normative rhetoric.
One last point. Discrimination between elite (read Protestant) and other lawyers hardly was
something new. In fact the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, founded in 1870, was
itself an attempt to stratify the bar, and every president of the ABCNY from 1870 to 1920 was
listed in the New York Social Register.49 Its Grievance Committee spent disproportionate amounts
of time investigating ethnic lawyers who typically were sole practitioners rather than corporate
lawyers who were members of firms. The American Bar Association was little better. J. Clay
Smith, Jr., in his study of Black lawyers, quotes one Ainfluential@ ABA member in the 1920's as
noting that Athe legal profession was a means by which Jews, immigrants, and city-dwellers might
undermine the American way of life.@50 Thus, the ABA attempted to shut down law schools
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Then and Now, New York Law Journal, September 11, 1995, p. S1.
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J. Clay Smith, Jr., EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER, 1844-1944 (1993); Robert
Stevens, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S (1983) 100-01; 184;
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catering to these three groups whom, as we will see, in New York were all one and the same: Jews.
And while in the very early years, the Adregs@ of the bar consisted of a more varied group of
minorities (some Irish lawyers as well as Jews, who were centered at least in part around the
Tammany Hall machine), by 1944 the demographics of the bar, but not the attitude of the elites,
significantly had changed.
Concrete evidence of antisemitism appears in a report (the AReport@) based on a study of the
Conference on Jewish Relations, led by Simon Rifkind. (Rifkind was later to become a name
partner of one of New York=s premier law firms, a firm that included, among others, Lloyd
Garrison, dean of the University of Wisconsin Law School and grandson of the great abolitionist
William Lloyd Garrison, and adopted principles of racial and ethnic equality as well as public
service.)51 The Report describes in excruciating empirical detail the plight of Jewish lawyers in
New York in the 1930s.52 It begins by quoting one New York Jewish lawyer as describing the
practice of law as A>a dignified road to starvation.=@53 And based on the data revealed in the Report,
this was far more the rule for Jewish lawyers than the exception. But my interest is not in disparate
income. It is in the evidence of discrimination that led to that disparity.

Auerbach, supra note
51

.

Melvin M. Fagen, THE STATUS OF JEWISH LAWYERS IN NEW YORK CITY, 1 Jewish Soc. Stud. 73 (1939)

Paul Weiss traces its roots to 1875 but took its modern form in 1946. Rifkind joined the firm in 1950. In
the interest of full disclosure, I spent several happy years as an associate at the firm, Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton and
Garrison.
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Fagen, supra note __ . Further evidence of bar stratification and its antisemitic basis is provided in
Richard L. Abel, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989) at 85-87, and Edward A. Purcell, Jr., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY:
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Let=s begin with the demographics of the bar. The Report estimated that approximately
22,000 lawyers were practicing in all five boroughs in 1937, of whom 11,400 were Jewish. Of the
11,400, 9,467 practiced in Manhattan.54 At that time, Jews constituted roughly 28% of the
population of New York City.55 Clearly the proportion of Jewish lawyers was grossly
disproportionate to the number of Jews in the population.56
The first interesting question is where these lawyers were educated, since the Report
convincingly concludes that an important determinant of income and status within the bar was the
law school attended.57 Fully 66.8% of Jewish lawyers who had attended law school graduated
either from Brooklyn (25.8%), New York University (22.7%, and which was at least 45 to 50
years away from joining the ranks of the elite), New York Law School (12.1%), St. John=s Law
School (10.7%), and Fordham (6.2%), none of which even remotely numbered among the elite law
schools in the nation. The only elite school attended by New York Jewish lawyers in any
54

The identification of lawyers in New York was based upon United States census data. The identification of
Jewish lawyers was done by including those lawyers who listed themselves as belonging to Jewish organizations or
contributing to Jewish charities, as well as by a search through Martindale-Hubbell for lawyers with Aobviously@
Jewish names. Those lawyers with Aobviously@ non-Jewish names were excluded, and an ambiguous group consisting
of about 3,000 lawyers was further reduced as much as possible by discussion with lawyers familiar with those in
question. Fagen concedes the imprecision of this methodology, supra note __ at 75, and I, whose decidedly nonJewish name was bestowed unwillingly upon my family by an insistent customs official, am particularly sensitive to
this flaw. Nonetheless, based on its methodology, the survey seems more likely to have underestimated the number of
Jewish lawyers than overestimated them.
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The population of New York City in 1940 was 7,454,995.
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For an explanation of the sources of population data, see Appendix A. I have no effective means of
counting commuting lawyers and their ethnicity living in suburbs like Bronxville, Greenwich, and Scarsdale. It is
well-known, however, that Jews had not significantly migrated to the suburbs at this time and that suburbs like those
mentioned did not welcome Jews. In the case of Bronxville, it positively excluded them. For evidence that Jewish
migration to the suburbs significantly began at the end of World War II see William E. Nelson, THE LEGALIST
REFORMATION: LAW, POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY IN NEW YORK, 1920-1980 (2001).
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meaningful numbers was Columbia (11%), somewhat of an oddity in light of that university=s own
antisemitic tradition.58
The Report identifies the principal reason for Jewish attendance at lower-level law schools
in the fact that they had night programs and tuition was cheaper59, two factors highly important to
students from relatively poor families. It never mentions antisemitism as a factor at all. Auerbach,
Howe, and Baltzell, however, all clearly identify antisemitism as a major factor limiting Jewish
attendance at elite universities.60
Let=s see how this educational disadvantage led to a bar structure highly disadvantageous
to Jews. In 1937, few Jewish lawyers were corporate practitioners, by far the most lucrative
practice area. Only 11% of Jewish lawyers reported having a corporate practice, with a large
plurality dependent upon small merchants (35.28%), and Ageneral@ practice (22.15%). Sixty
percent of Jewish lawyers reported being sole practitioners, the lowest income level group with a
1937 median of $1,874 ($24,105).61 Only 6% reported being the head of a firm (with a median

to this article.
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income of $8,879 ($114, 213)), 15% reported being a member of a firm (with a median income of
$ 4,137 ($53, 215)) and 14% reported working as an employee of a firm (with a median income of
$4,137 ($53,215)). The median income for Jewish lawyers as a group was $2,426 ($31,206),
compared with $2,990 ($38, 461) for all New York lawyers. Throughout their careers, New York
lawyers as a group ranged from 21% as firm members (with five to 10 years experience), to
35.34% as firm members (with 17-23 years of experience), and with comparable proportions (in
the mid-30% range) for lawyers throughout their careers. As heads of offices, the most lucrative
practice situation, lawyers in the general New York population ranged from 14.38% for 5-10 years
of experience up to a high of 33.38% for 24-34 years of experience. In their early years of practice,
New York lawyers as a whole were employed overwhelmingly more than Jews in firms, 39.27% to
9.74% from 4 years or less, diminishing to 22.16% versus 11.82%, 11.27% to 19.93%, and
reaching a situational reversal of 3.02% to 29.16% for 35 years of practice and more.62 Looking at
the numbers, the clear explanation for the increase of Jewish firm employees and the decrease of
employee-lawyers in the general population can be found in the substantial increase in the general
population of lawyers who became members of the firms by which they were employed, or headed
their own firms, numbers which remained relatively insignificant for Jewish lawyers. The vast
majority of Jewish lawyers did not have firm jobs early in their careers, which of course is the time
when the track to partnership is established, and this most likely accounts for their small proportion
of membership in firms. While they may have been more accepted as firm employees when they
became more experienced lawyers, they were clearly not accepted as firm members.

the same source of conversion throughout this article.
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Fagen, supra at note __ at 86-92, 101-103.
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The conclusion that the vast majority of Jewish lawyers were marginalized in the New
York bar only seven years before the adoption of Section 61-b is inescapable.63 Nor had the
situation changed in any meaningful way by 1960, the next year for which significant data are
available and a period not long before the Supreme Court began to impose substantial restrictions
on securities litigation. The data come from a report drafted by Columbia sociologist Jerome
Carlin (the ACarlin Report@), examining the Asocial conditions of moral integrity in the legal
profession.@ 64 The Carlin Report, despite its broad ambition, limited its inquiry to the New York
bar as the nation=s most significant. Carlin=s conclusions that ethical behavior is a function of
status within the bar and the determining nature of one=s practice are important, and will become
relevant later in this section. For now, I want simply to concentrate on the data that more or less
parallel Fagen=s 1939 study.
In 1960 (the focal year of Carlin=s data), there were approximately 26,000 lawyers in
Manhattan and the Bronx, of whom 17,000 were active private practitioners. Seventy percent of
these lawyers reported receiving at least 50% of their income from business practice, but the vast
majority of these represented small businessmen and closely held corporations. Only 20% reported
that most of their work involved representing large corporations.65 In describing the hierarchical
structure of the New York bar, Carlin notes that Athe firm is the significant unit for the system of
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Stevens, supra note __ at 146. (AIn the 1930s to the 1940s, Jewish students were heavily channeled into
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social stratification of the bar.@66 While 4,300 law offices with from one to 100 lawyers were
counted in Manhattan and the Bronx, and more than 50% of lawyers reported working in firms,
only 21% reported working in firms of 15 or more, a fact which has a great deal of significance for
bar hierarchy.67
Before linking firm size and the nature of practice with ethnicity, I shall take a brief look at
the ethnic composition of the bar in 1960. One interesting change from the 1937 data, which
reported that only 68.6% of Jewish lawyers were native born in contrast to 80.8% of the bar
overall,68 is that the Carlin report shows that Aalmost all@ members of the New York bar were
native born. More than sixty percent of these were Jewish, in contrast to 18% Catholic and 18%
Protestant.69 Fully 70% of Jewish lawyers were of eastern European descent (recall the earlier
class distinction and difference in social acceptability between German and eastern European
Jews).70 Thirty-six percent of all lawyers graduated from what Carlin describes as Ahigh quality
university law schools.@
Where a nascent lawyer attended law school was of critical importance to bar status. In
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Carlin, supra note _ at 18.
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Fagen, supra note _ at 79.
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Carlin=s data refers to all practicing lawyers, regardless of date of admission to the bar. Breaking down the
data further, he notes that the proportion of Catholic lawyers remained constant, the proportion of Jewish lawyers
since the Fagen report had declined to 50% in the mid >30s to mid >40s, then rising and stabilizing at 65%, and the
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programs. Carlin, supra note _ at 20-21.
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fact, Carlin notes that the social status of lawyers really was fixed upon their matriculation into
college, beginning a circular trap in which the status of undergraduate institution was dependent
upon religion and parental socio-economic status, and the likelihood of admission to elite law
school was dependant upon the status of undergraduate institution, with the result that Jewish
lawyers whose parents had relatively low socioeconomic status had little chance of attaining elite
status in the bar.71
The 1960 data bear this out, but they also tell a more troubling story. It seems almost too
obvious to state that there was significant discrimination among Jews at the elite colleges and law
schools. As to college, 70% of Protestants of high socio-economic status, 42% of middle socioeconomic status, and 28% of low socio-economic status attended Ivy League or similar quality
colleges.72 By contrast, 34% of Jews of high socio-economic status, 17% of middle socioeconomic status, and 9% of low socio-economic status, attended similar colleges. At the top
schools, the relationship between high socio-economic Protestants and Jews is almost inverse. A
high socio-economic status Jew was only 6% more likely to attend a top college than a low socioeconomic Protestant (where the difference was 42 percentage points among Protestants).73 To put it
differently, a low status Protestant had an almost three in one chance of attending an Ivy League
school. For the low status Jew the chances were slightly less than one in ten.
71
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Seventy-seven percent of large firm lawyers attended Ivy League law schools in contrast to
only 20% of small-firm lawyers and sole practitioners. While the disparity between Protestants
and Jews attending top law schools diminishes dramatically (though it remains significant) among
nascent lawyers attending top quality colleges, the initial disparity in college attendance
considerably magnifies the difference. 74
But it=s not just about law school and college. Race played a seemingly independent role in
bar status. Only 19% of Jews with a top education were members of large firms compared with
45% of Protestants. As Carlin notes, A a Jewish lawyer who achieved high academic standing (that
is, was selected for the staff of law review) in an Ivy League school has no better chance of being
in a large firm than a Protestant lawyer who did not >make law review= and who attended a non-Ivy
League law school.75@
Finally, for our purposes, Carlin demonstrates that there was substantial immobility
between strata of the bar throughout a lawyer=s career, and that race played an important role in this
as well.

It should not be surprising by this point to realize that Jewish lawyers had significantly

less upward mobility and more downward mobility than Protestant lawyers. One of the important
practical results of all of this, which I will discuss further in Part II, is that lawyers at different
levels of the bar had very little contact with one another and very little shared professional
experience. As one piece of evidence, it=s worth noting that the prestigious Association of the Bar
74
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of the City of New York was dominated by Protestant, large-firm lawyers, while the more plebeian
New York County Lawyers= Association was populated principally by small firm lawyers and sole
practitioners (and hence, Jews).76
Needless to say, antisemitic discrimination in the bar at least mirrored the problem of
antisemitism and racial exclusion in the larger society.77 The marginalization of Jews at the lowest
levels of the bar (and at the correspondingly lowest income levels), as well as their social exclusion
from the circles traveled by large-firm elite Protestant lawyers, sets the stage for the suspicion and
hostility that led to the restrictions on stockholder litigation and our attitude towards the corporate
plaintiffs= bar.78 Let me now turn to describe those restrictions and their historical development.
III. The Development of Restrictions on Stockholder Litigation
The restrictions on stockholder litigation in which I=m interested cover two principal areas:
Derivative litigation against corporate officers and directors, and securities fraud litigation,
typically brought in the form of class action suits against corporations and their officers and
directors. Class actions, which really only developed in the 1960s, are far more technically
76
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I point out, as an aside, that such subtle exclusion continues in some Protestant circles today. In 1998 I
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associate becomes a partner.) Even discounting for the firm=s tendency to hire principally from elite law schools, this
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complex and have much broader application than derivative actions. As a consequence, my main
focus is on derivative litigation, although the attitudes towards plaintiffs= lawyers formed in that
context transferred to the securities class action context when that became the dominant mode of
challenging corporate misbehavior. I=ve already mentioned one of the earliest forms of restriction
on derivative litigation, section 61-b of the New York Business Corporations Law. Before
explaining how the restrictions contained in the statute affect plaintiffs, a brief primer on derivative
litigation is in order.
The locus of (almost) absolute power in the corporation is the board of directors, a
statutorily created body with the function of overseeing the affairs of the corporation. Over time,
the board=s role has evolved from a more managerial to a more monitoring role (including the very
important function of hiring and firing the CEO). In light of the fact that the board=s powers are
virtually absolute, the law has imposed on directors (and on corporate officers and other employees
as well), fiduciary duties to the corporation designed to ensure that those powers are exercised in
the corporation=s best interest and not for the benefit of corporate insiders or anybody else. In a
post-Enron world, it doesn=t require much proof to establish (if it ever did) that directors and
officers sometimes violate these fiduciary obligations, either by shirking their responsibilities
(governed by a doctrine known as the duty of care) or by enriching themselves at the corporation=s
expense (governed by a doctrine known as the duty of loyalty). It is undisputed that the board is
the ultimate voice of the corporation. Hence a dilemma. If the board speaks for the corporation,
how likely is it that it will sue itself (or members of the board or corporate officers) in cases in
which they violate their fiduciary duties? The answer should be obvious.
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Equity rode to the rescue.79 In order to permit meaningful enforcement of these duties,
courts created the device of the derivative suit. Put simply, derivative suits permit a stockholder
(after making a demand on the board to rectify the situation and having that demand rejected) to
bring a suit against the offenders in the name of the corporation. Technically the derivative suit is a
two-part action, the first being the stockholder=s suit against the corporation to bring action, and the
second the corporation=s suit (through the stockholder as nominal plaintiff) against the offending
officers and directors.
Contemporary law has developed the procedural prerequisites of derivative litigation to the
point where it=s extremely difficult for a plaintiff ever to get to the merits of the case. But
derivative litigation did seem to present a problem. You see, unless a stockholder owned very
substantial amounts of stock (and few did), no one stockholder had much of an incentive to sue the
directors or officers. Recovery per share was likely to be minimal except in the very rare case of
massive wrongdoing, and such amounts as were recovered went to the corporation as the real party
in interest. Thus even if a stockholder were to recover, that recovery would be indirect, in the form
(theoretically at least) of an increase in share value.
So somebody needed an incentive to sue if the duties were to be enforced at all (since it is a
pretty ironclad rule of corporate law that only shareholders have standing to sue to enforce these
duties in the first place). The solution was to permit the successful plaintiff=s lawyer to recover
attorney=s fees. Because these cases were taken on a contingent basis (for obvious reasons), the
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component of recovery reflecting attorney=s fees could be quite substantial, thereby giving lawyers
an incentive to take the risk of representing a small stockholder in enforcing fiduciary duties and
thus assuring them of having some meaning.80
But there, of course, is the rub. For once lawyers had a financial incentive to sue
corporations, corporations and their lawyers panicked at the prospect of meretricious litigation,
brought solely for the purpose of forcing settlements and enriching lawyers. And, based on our
understanding of the demographics of the New York bar (where of course so many of these suits
were brought), who do you think the plaintiffs= lawyers in these suits were? Jewish lawyers of
course. But that part of our story is for later.
In any event, the prospect of litigation run amok led to the demand for mechanisms to sort
out the legitimate lawsuits from the Astrike suits.@ Thus was enacted New York section 61-b.81
The reasoning is obvious. If the problem was excessive litigation instigated by people who had no
financial interest in the corporation (the lawyers and their shareholding clients) and therefore could
not be expected to protect its best interests (quite the contrary), discouraging suit by all but the
most significant stockholders ensured that only stockholders who had the interests of the
corporation in mind would sue. Thus, you will recall, New York 61-b required stockholders who
owned less than $50,000 in value ($ 507,950 in 2002 dollars) or 5% of the stock to post security
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worth noting that the New York legislature that passed that statute consisted of 51 senators, of whom only 5 had
clearly Jewish surnames, and 150 assemblyman, of whom 11 had clearly Jewish surnames. This was an era in which
Jews generally did not seek elective office. Howe, supra note __ at __.
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for expenses, a costly undertaking in the first place but even more so when one considers that the
losing plaintiff would forfeit the bond and be liable for defendant=s expenses. Thus the rule
virtually ensured that small stockholders would practically be precluded from bringing suit.
Now if you think about it, the rule makes no sense if the purpose is to limit stockholder
litigation only to those suits having merit. In the first place, as I already noted, recovery in a
derivative action goes to the corporation, not the stockholder. Consequently, a large stockholder
would have invested his time and effort in litigation for the purpose of restoring the corporation=s
value (and only partly and indirectly his individual wealth), thus posing a classic free-rider
problem. Why should a large stockholder bother to sue when so much of the benefit would go
(indirectly) to the other stockholders anyway?82 And why, indeed, when a stockholder with such a
large block ought to be in a position to negotiate for a side deal with management on his own? So
the ultimate effect of this restriction is to prevent litigation altogether, in the absence of a small
stockholder or law firm capable of bearing the financial risk of the litigation.83 And that, indeed,
should be the end of our story. But it isn=t quite the end.
First, although I=ve described the perceived problem of derivative litigation as being the
greed of plaintiffs= lawyers leading them to vex and irritate perfectly innocent (and socially
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The personal benefits to the large stockholder might outweigh the cost of bringing suit. More likely, even
if the stockholder had a large, illiquid position which might otherwise make suit worthwhile, he could use the power
that accompanies the position to pressure management (unless he held a large minority block in a close corporation).
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The New York Court of Appeals provided relief to plaintiffs in 1950 in Baker v. McFadden Publications,
Inc., 300 N.Y. 325, 90 N.E. 2d 876 (1950), in which it held that plaintiffs as to whom the statute was invoked and
upon whom an order to post security for expenses levied could vacate the order if they were able to solicit sufficient
additional stockholders to meet the statute=s threshold and act as plaintiffs. According to Stanley Nemzer, a prominent
New York plaintiffs= lawyer at the time, this pretty much ended defendants= practice of invoking the statute in order to
avoid plaintiffs= circulating serious allegations of wrongdoing about the corporation or its managers among its
stockholders. Interview with Stanley Nemzer at the Offices of Wolf Popper, New York City, Friday, April 12, 2002.
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superior) corporate executives with meretricious suits, how big a problem really was derivative
litigation? The answer is that it was a not a major problem at all. The Wood Report, my analysis
of which follows, would make it seem like a problem of great significance. But a survey of the law
review literature from 1900 through 1944 revealed only 44 law review articles, almost all of them
student notes, in which derivative litigation even was mentioned. Most of these were focused on
the substantive analysis of managerial duties and insider trading, and virtually all of them called for
strengthening managerial duties and loosening existing restrictions on derivative litigation. It is
worth noting, as an aside, that half of these articles were written after 1929, suggesting that the
1929 Crash and subsequent Depression provoked greater interest in managers= duties. This hardly
indicates that derivative litigation was a problem of widespread concern and attention, at least
among academics and law students.84
Why the concern then, and how was the statute justified? While not a problem of academic
interest, perhaps it was a practical problem. Professor Hornstein=s tale of a last-minute attack by
the release of a secret weapon by the New York Chamber of Commerce is born out by the evidence
and appears in the form of the innocently titled: Survey and Report Regarding Stockholders=
Derivative Suits, authored by Franklin S. Wood on behalf of the Special Committee on Corporate
Litigation of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York. The Report covers 117 pages
84

For a few examples see George T. Washington, Stockholders= Derivative Suits: The Company=s Role, and
A Suggestion, 25 Cornell L. Q. 361 (1940) (one of the few articles suggesting reform while expressing the importance
of shareholder litigation), Note, Rights of Individual Shareholders against Directors Who Secretly Secure Better
Terms for Themselves than for Others in Sale of the Shares of all Members, 20 Cornell L. Q. 101 (1935), Note, The
Liability of Directors and Officers for Misrepresentation in the Sale of Securities, 34 column. L. Rev. 1090 (1934);
Note, The Statute of Limitations in Stockholders= Derivative Suits Against Directors, 34 Column. L. Rev. 842 (1939);
George D. Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholders= Derivative Suits, 34 Column. L. Rev. 784 (1939)(noting,
interestingly and relevant to my discussion of the Wood Report, that most derivative litigation involved common law
and early federal securities law insider trading), id. at 797; Note, The Director of a Corporation as a Fiduciary, 20
Iowa L. Rev. 808 (1935).
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of text, along with four substantial appendices, the last of which consists of 18 elaborate charts
purportedly detailing every derivative action in New York=s First Department (Manhattan and the
Bronx), Second Department (Brooklyn, Rockland and Westchester counties), and the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York. It is particularly interesting that the author
engaged in such detailed examination of the files, yet limited his report to derivative litigation
without any comparative data on litigation in general. It is particularly odd in light of the fact that
in 1934 (two years after the beginning of the ten year period examined by the Wood Report), the
Judicial Council of the State of New York had begun to compile highly detailed records on all
litigation occurring in New York State trial courts, records ignored by Wood.85 Although
contemporaneous critiques of the Wood Report exist, I have analyzed the report independently.86
But first a word about the Committee that supported Wood. The Committee consisted of
three members besides Wood; Richard Lawrence, Thomas Parkinson, and Arthur Reis. Wood
himself was a prominent New York lawyer who, after graduating from Cornell and Cornell Law
School, spent several years practicing in Honolulu before returning to New York where he began
his own practice until joining what became Hawkins, Delafield & Wood in 1945. Perhaps the
most interesting aspect of Mr. Wood=s life for our purposes is not his professional life but the fact
that he lived in Bronxville, a town known for its exclusion of Jews, and was a member of the
Bronxville Board of Zoning Appeal from 1948 to 1958. Not only as a resident, then, but as a
public official, he was undoubtedly quite conscious, and presumably supportive of, the
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Zlinkoff=s, supra note __, is the most thorough and thoughtful, and I shall draw upon his critique for one
set of data not otherwise readily available.
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AGentlemen=s Agreement@ to exclude Jews that existed in Bronxville.87 Wood was a member of
the University Club (described by Birmingham as Afor years, the most steadfastly anti-Jewish club
in New York@)88 as well as several other clubs.89
To locate the other committee members within the WASP caste, Lawrence was a member
of the Union League of New York and Parkinson a member of the Century Association, both clubs
identified by Baltzell as high in the ranks of the WASP aristocracy.90 Parkinson was also a
member of the Washington, D.C. Cosmos Club, itself highly exclusive (and co-founded by Henry
Adams).
Arthur Reis was a Jew, an unsurprising fact given the long historical presence of the token
(or ACourt@) Jew in most non-Jewish establishment organizations, a Jew whose American role it
was to lend validity to the decisions of the powerful from Athe@ Jewish perspective.91 Nor is it
87

Bronxville=s discriminatory history is well-known in the New York area. Like the antisemitism implicit in
61-b itself, it is only circumstantially demonstrable (evidently Bronxville builders were not so crude as to include
restrictive covenants in their deeds), but those circumstances are rather powerful. See e.g., Harry Gersh, Gentlemen=s
Agreement in Bronxville, Commentary, February 1959, p.109, Marilynn Wood Hill, Bronxville: From Country
Hamlet to Suburb, in BUILDING A SUBURBAN VILLAGE: BRONXVILLE, NEW YORK, 1898-1998 (Eloise L. Morgan, ed.
1998), pp. 17-19.
While the situation undoubtedly has improved, it is worth noting that one Bronxville resident to whom I
spoke said that things were better, telling me that one of the town board members even was Amarried to a Jew.@ This
kind of remark, no matter how well-meaning, is of course precisely the kind of subconscious racism so well described
by Charles Lawrence. Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection : Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317 (1987). I confess that I was waiting for my interlocutor to tell me that
some of her Abest friends were Jewish.@
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Like antisemitism itself, Wood evidently was a complex man. He served as plaintiffs= counsel in at least
one derivative suit in 1934, and was defense counsel in two others. As plaintiff=s counsel, he worked with a Jewish
firm. I don=t quite know what to make of this other than the assertion I already made; Wood, like antisemitism, was
complex.
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Baltzell, supra note _ at 368-71.
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entirely surprising in light of the fact that Reis was of German Jewish descent which meant, as I
described earlier in the text, that he was likely to have been socially acceptable at one level and that
he largely was capable of Apassing.@ And while we know relatively little about him, he likely
shared the prejudices of his class with respect to his eastern brethren.92

Reis= father, Robert, was a

German-born Jew who established Robert Reis & Company in 1885.93 The now defunct Robert
Reis & Company became one of the larger mens= underwear manufacturers. Arthur Reis joined the
firm after receiving his A.B. from Columbia in 1903. He eventually succeeded his father as
president of the company.94 His wife, Claire Raphael Reis, was also from an unusually privileged
Jewish background. She was born in 1888 in Brownsville, Texas but was educated in Germany,

in which country the Hofjude, or Court Jew, actually became an official position in the courts of many nobles. The
original function of the Court Jew was as a financial advisor, and often a financier as well, since many of the Court
Jews were chosen from among the wealthy and because of their excellent business connections. Court Jews often
formed family allegiances with other Court Jews which created a kind of upper class among European Jewry, and
Court Jews were often subjected to the contempt of other Jews because of their strong desire and often successful
attempts to assimilate into mainstream society. At the same time, because of their high positions, Court Jews often
were able to, and did, intercede with governing authorities on behalf of the Jewish community. There were no Court
Jews as such in America. However, the phrase came to be used as an epithet to describe obsequious Jews who
attached themselves to powerful political or business men and who were highly discreet and subordinate with respect
to matters of Jewish concern, thus forgoing the opportunity to help other Jews that was utilized by European Court
Jews. See generally Ze=ev Glicenstein, The Era of the Court Jew, The Canadian Jewish News, March 14, 2002,
www.cjnews.com/pastissues/02/mar14-02/feature3.htm, Philologos, Court Jews: Our Man in Vienna, Forward,
February 1, 2002, http://www.forward.com/issues/2002/02.02.01/arts5.html, David E. Lipman, Gates to Jewish
Heritage: The Court Jews, http://www.jewishgates.org/history/jewhis/court.stm. , FROM COURT JEWS TO THE
ROTHSCHILDS: ART, PATRONAGE, POWER, 1600-1800 (Vivian B. Mann and Richard I. Cohen, eds 1996), Selma
Stern, THE COURT JEW: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORY OF ABSOLUTISM IN EUROPE (1985).
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I have been able to find out relatively little about Reis other than his background and principal activities.
Thus I cannot be sure that his attitude towards the class of Jewish lawyers with which we=re concerned was negative.
The circumstances alone suggest that it was likely that he shared the prejudices of the German-Jewish class, and
would have been unlikely to have raised, even if he had seen, the antisemitism implicit in the statute and the Wood
Report.
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Arthur M. Reis, 64, A Manufacturer, N.Y. Times, December 24, 1947 (obituary) at 21.
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France and the United States.95 Interested in music, she was very active in promoting and teaching
classical music in New York City. She became a well-known authority on the subject, received
numerous awards, published many articles, and was even invited by Franklin D. Roosevelt to
serve on the Committee on the Use of Leisure Time.96 Notwithstanding his privileged background
and status, it is unlikely that Reis=s business would, at an earlier time, have put him at the very
highest levels of German-Jewish aristocracy, but he was a member of the Century Club which had
supplanted the Harmonie Club at the apex of German-Jewish Society.97
I said that I wasn=t going to employ excessive rhetoric, but it is worth noting a couple of
statements in the Wood Report that reflect its deep hostility to derivative litigation. First, the
Report uses the term Avexatious litigation ,@ 98 the very term, as we=ll see, that is used by Rehnquist
in Blue Chip (despite the fact that it appears in none of the briefs in that case). But even more, the
Report examines the relationship of stockholder-plaintiff to lawyer and concludes: AThis shoddy
burlesque of a professional relationship to clients makes the ambulance-chaser by comparison a
paragon of propriety.@99
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Donna P. Parker, Reis, Claire Raphael, The Handbook of Texas Online available at
http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/RR/fre51.html
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Wood, supra note __ at 48. The term Avexatious litigation@ has been in use since at least the 17th century,
according to the Oxford English Dictionary and refers to lawsuits brought without merit by Aevil disposed Persons.@
A full etymology of the term is beyond the scope of this Article, but it is clearly meant to cast aspersions on those who
are alleged to bring such suits.
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Wood, supra note __ at 47 The Aambulance chaser@, by the way, was an earlier term of epithet for
plaintiffs= lawyers coined by the elite WASP members of the bar. Of course they were referring largely to Jewish
lawyers. Auerbach, supra note __ at 42-44.
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In further criticizing the lawyer-client relationship, Wood notes that A . . . an inexhaustible
supply of the smallest of small investors have suddenly become masters of the most intricate
details of corporate finance, and the most alert of sentinels to employ attorneys and attack
corporate management on the slightest suspicion of a big lawsuit.@ He then goes on to note the
prominence of women among the plaintiffs and lists those suits which feature women plaintiffs,
after which he rather sarcastically speculates as to their financial sophistication and research
behavior. (Sexism, however, is not the focus of this paper.) What Wood declines to mention, but
is clear to any reader, is that of the 32 listed actions, the plaintiffs in 21 of them obviously have
traditional Jewish surnames, with an additional seven (for a total of 29 out of 32) having arguably
Jewish surnames. It wouldn=t have taken much for a reader of the time to substitute AJews@ for
Awomen.@100
More troubling, perhaps, is the disingenuous, if not downright dishonest, methodology of
the Wood Report, for in detailing the alleged crisis of derivative litigation, it looks only at
derivative litigation and not at all at how it fares in relation to other forms of litigation. So let=s
take a look at the actual numbers, starting with those set out in the Wood Report. From 1932 to
1942, Wood identified 1,400 minority stockholders= actions (1,266 after eliminating duplication),
of which 693 involved close corporations (of no particular interest to us here) and 573 involved
public corporations.101 Of these, thirteen cases, or 2%, resulted in recovery by the corporation, 33
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Comparing Wood=s text with the tables following the Wood Report, it appears that approximately 20% of
plaintiffs were women, not an overwhelming proportion but, perhaps, given the time and subject matter of the suits,
still an unusually large proportion. It=s also interesting to note the misrepresentation of the text in light of the data
presented in the tables. Given the other flaws in the Wood report, it is at least a legitimate inference that Wood chose
the obviously Jewish female plaintiffs from among this 20% to present in his text.
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Wood=s numbers appear in this summary discussion format at pp. 6-7. Derivative litigation against close
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(or 6%) were settled with court approval, and 215 (or 37%) were dismissed. Of the 342 cases not
accounted for, 60 (10%) were Asettled privately@ (presumably without court approval), 155 (27%)
were discontinued, 54 were still pending at the publication of the Wood Report, and there was no
identifiable disposition as to the remaining 43. Wood goes on to note that in those actions that
were successful (i.e., resulting in a verdict for the corporation), only about 5% of the amount
claimed was recovered, and in those recoveries based upon court- approved settlements, 3% of the
claimed amount was recovered. The solution to eliminating this abuse, according to Wood, is
legislation in the form ultimately passed as section 61-b, which would Alargely abate@ Athe major
vices of promiscuous derivative actions. . . .@ 102
But how Apromiscuous@ were these actions and does the data support the conclusion that
derivative suits presented a crisis so significant that legislation virtually eliminating them was
justifiable? In order to evaluate this claim, let=s look at information compiled by the State of New
York as to litigation generally in the First Department.103
From 1935 through 1942, the average number of civil cases in the First Department ranged
from 34,429 to 58,579, with a mean of 51,500 cases a year in the First Department.104 The number
of derivative suits (using Wood=s numbers which include, without distinction, suits involving both

corporations are not of interest because they principally involve disputes among shareholders, some if not all of
whom are managers, and typically involve questions of the distribution of corporate wealth among the shareholders
rather than wrongdoing by officers and directors.
102

Wood, supra note __ at 24
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All of the following data is taken from the annual tables presented as this report. I have calculated the
proportions. I have also left out the data from the Second Department as it is consistent with the data from the First
Department and would lengthen this discussion for no appreciable gain.
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I have used the mean instead of median simply because, as the table in Appendix __ shows, they are
sufficiently close that I thought the mean to be at least as representative a figure as the median.
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closely held and public corporations, and leaving aside the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York as to which comparable data were unavailable)105 ranged from 139 to 80,
with a mean of 109. To further put these numbers in context, during the period 1935 to 1942,
derivative suits ranged from .41% to .22% of all civil cases, or a mean of .29%. Put differently,
out of a total of 281,423 civil cases in the First Department during this period, a grand total of 815
(or .29%) were derivative. Since 58% of these on average involved closely held corporations, that
means only 342, or .12%, involved publicly held corporations.106
It seems fair to conclude, then, that as far as the consumption of public resources is
concerned and despite the very real existence of strike suits, derivative litigation posed no
significant burden. At least Wood provides no credible evidence that the negative aspects of
derivative litigation (the strike suit) outweighed the positives. But there are a number of potential
objections to this. First is the possibility that plaintiffs= lawyers made pre-litigation demands on
boards to obtain bribes. Next is that the success rate (or even trial rate) of derivative suits was so
out of proportion to that of all civil litigation that they ought to have been curbed. Third might be
that derivative suits were so generally meretricious that they were disproportionately dismissed or
settled. Fourth would be that the amount of recovery was so low that they were simply harassment
without significant benefit to the corporation and thus had little justification.
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The number of Second Circuit cases were a very small proportion of the total (130 out of 1,400 in all.)
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There is no convenient way of backing out the derivative suits brought in the Second Circuit from these
numbers since Wood purported to eliminate duplicative suits without indicating where they were brought. Given the
relatively small number of derivative cases brought in the Second Circuit, it seems fair to conclude that they don=t
materially affect the results.
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As to the first objection, it may be that even if derivative litigation as litigation did not
produce significant volume, plaintiffs= lawyers were using the procedures of derivative litigation to
Ahold up@ corporations and their executives. With rare exception, a prerequisite to derivative
standing is that the plaintiff has served a demand on the board to correct the action of which he
complains. Perhaps plaintiffs= lawyers engaged in a practice of promiscuous demand-making,
leading corporations to make payments in the nature of bribes to discourage them from filing
lawsuits. If this were true, plaintiffs= lawyers could well have had a valuable business in derivative
litigation that never reached general public view, and the comparative paucity of derivative suits
would have no bearing on the scope of the problem which could nonetheless have been significant
for corporations.
Such a story is implausible. Or rather, it is only plausible to the (implausible) extent that
plaintiffs= lawyers never talked with one another and therefore the (implausible) extent to which
corporations would have been able to keep such payments secret. Otherwise, as Macey and Miller
note with respect to strike suits, such payments would be rare.107 The reason is that corporations
that paid such bribes would rapidly become known as suckers and attractive targets for plaintiffs=
lawyers, resulting in frequent and expensive demands. The only rational recourse to such
demands, as it is to derivative litigation, is resistance. Thus, the Aunder the radar screen@ argument
for the significance of the strike suit problem is quite weak.
Let=s take a look at the second claim, that the success rate of derivative litigation was
disproportionately low compared with all civil litigation. The numbers do bear this out in
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percentage terms, but when one looks at the absolute numbers it appears as if litigation in general
was not a terribly successful plaintiffs= endeavor (in fact it appears that litigation rarely was
pursued to completion). Looking solely at jury trials, from 1934 to 1942 (the period under study),
the number of cases that resulted in victory for the plaintiff after trial ranged from 458 to 609, or
from .81% to 1.36% of all civil cases. Those that were settled or discontinued after trial ranged
from 619 to 1,158, or from 1.57% to 2.06% of all civil cases. At the same time, verdicts for
defendants after trial ranged from 295 to 474, or from .50% to 1.00% of the total. Finally, average
monetary awards to plaintiffs ranged from $5,407 ($ 59,311) to $7,800 ($101,798), with a mean of
$6,207 ($79,852). In light of median incomes at the time, these hardly seem like exorbitant
judgments.108
There is less complete data available for bench trials that went to completion, but from
1934 to 1942 the number of completed bench trials ranged from 1,129 to 1,601, or from 2.11
percent to 4.24 percent. Finally, the number of trials as a percentage of all cases (without regard to
disposition) ranged from 1,884 to 2,216, or from 3.51% to 6.44% of all cases on the calendar
during the year.
Zlinkoff provides some interesting additional analysis.109 Noting both that the vast majority
of cases never went to trial and the absence of information as to why they were discontinued
(settlements, etc.), he argues that Ait would seem more proper in evaluating the results of derivative
suits to consider the figures for the number of suits in which issue was joined and thereafter either
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Zlinkoff, supra note __ at 362.
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the plaintiff or defendant was successful, eliminating actions that were discontinued.@110 Doing so,
he determines that issue was joined in 171 cases, of which 13 resulted in recoveries, and 93 in
settlements, with victory for the defendant in only 65 suits. That is to say, 62% of the suits in
which issue was joined resulted in stockholder victory.111 These are numbers which hardly suggest
abusive litigation was prevalent.
Even more interesting are the amounts awarded either upon plaintiffs= victory or settlement,
which suggest that successful derivative suits did indeed produce substantial damages. Drawing at
least in part from cases in which he was involved, Zlinkoff shows us damages in seven cases from
1935 to 1944 ranging between $350,000 ($3,555,650 in 2002) to $4,000,000 ($43,877,200 in
2002) with a mean of $1,665,771 ($20,261,105 in 2002) and a median of $1,800,000 ($21,893,760
in 2002).112 While these may seem modest in light of contemporary judgments (at least in part, one
suspects, because corporations were relatively smaller),113 they hardly seem out of line with the
legal fees of which Wood bitterly complains. Reporting fees in twelve derivative suits (which are
not, regrettably, the same cases reported by Zlinkoff but which do cover roughly the same period),
we see individual defendants= legal fees ranging from $4,890 ( $62,009 in 2002) to $135,000
($1,676,241 in 2002) with a mean of $ 38,178 ($464,627 in 2002) and a median of $16,000
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($194,611 in 2002).114 I should also point out that the $135,000 fee was highly aberrant C the next
largest fee was $71,490 ($ 869,547) with only two more fees over $50,000, two in the low
$30,000s, and the rest in the teens and below. Unfortunately Wood does not give the disposition of
any of these actions. However, these fees hardly seem disproportionate to the amounts of the
judgments noted by Zlinkoff and one could see them as a relatively low price to pay to enforce
fiduciary obligations, especially in light of the crisis precipitated by corporate America in the
1920s.115 Thus, when more data is introduced and Wood=s is carefully analyzed in context, it is
hard to see derivative suits as the scourge the Wood Report makes them out to be.
Now if nothing else is clear, it should be clear that the derivative suit was relatively rarely
brought and that it was very unlikely to have been used as a holdup device. When it was brought, it
was hardly extraordinarily frequent compared to other terms of litigation, and in fact fares rather
well against the data for all cases. And fees, while substantial, seem in line with judgments,
especially when one considers that the fees are for multiple defendants. Why then, one may ask,
the hysteria that led to invective and the desire to prohibit derivative suits outright?
Let=s pause before going on to the last two possibilities I mentioned earlier. For you may
well have detected a deficiency in my reporting. Combining the above data on the number and
practice-types of Jewish lawyers in the New York bar with this report on litigation success rates,
one might conclude that all types of lawsuits suffered from the same level of abuse that derivative
litigation did, and wonder why the Chamber of Commerce or other groups didn=t try to cut back on
114
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the ability to bring law suits in general. After all, as I noted earlier, the elite bar had been
contemptuous of Jewish lawyers and their practice generally for several decades prior to this.116
Conversely, one might wonder why I am attributing antisemitic motives to the drive to stop
derivative litigation and not other forms of litigation.
The answer begins to reveal itself when one looks at the practice areas in which the Jewish
bar was involved. As I reported above, the overwhelming number of Jewish lawyers represented
small merchants or individual clients. Fagen reports that 42% of Jewish lawyers represented
Amerchants@.117 The next largest proportion, 25%, represented a Ageneral@ clientele, and following
that, 14% reported representing corporations118 and 8.5% reported representing Awage earners and
small shopkeepers.@ Fields of representation for Jewish lawyers fall off significantly,
proportionally in the single digits, from that point. Carlin tells us that 70% of New York lawyers
reported deriving at least 50% of their income from business clients, but that Amost@ lawyers
representing corporations worked for closely held corporations.119 In addition, while large firms
reported 68% of their practice as involving business, small firms and sole practitioners, where
Jewish lawyers typically were found, reported 27% and 36% of their practice as involving
business. Moreover, only 14% of large firms and 34% of medium firms (which we have already
116
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seen were largely WASP) reported having a Amainly Jewish@ individual clientele, whereas 46% of
firms of two to four lawyers and 44% of sole practitioners reported having Amainly Jewish@
individual clients.120 In light of the practice of firms (including large firms) representing the
individual affairs of their business clients, and in light of the types of businesses Jews engaged
in121, one can infer, without too much difficulty, that much of the litigation that took place in New
York courts took place between individuals or small businessmen, largely Jewish and represented
by Jewish firms on both sides, such that WASP lawyers would be unlikely either to notice or to
care.
However, it is the large WASP firm that represented large, publicly-held corporate clients,
the very types of businesses that were likely to be targets of stockholder derivative suits. It is a
reasonable inference, although admittedly an inference, that these firms and their clients would be
far more aware of the perils of derivative litigation than of the lawsuits among the unwashed
masses that took up the rest of the trial calendars. Thus it would be natural for Wood to ignore
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Baltzell, supra note __ at 207-8, notes that Athe Protestant establishment@ in the 1920s and thereafter
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passage of the securities laws of the 1930s, occurred. Thus the WASP suspicion of plaintiffs= lawyers (and the
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period, can likely only be explained in terms of class which, given the structure of the bar, meant race.
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other types of litigation in his study.122 Had he not done so, his case, already weak when examined
in detail, would seem to have fallen apart solely on the numbers.
In order to cross-check these inferences, I looked at every derivative suit case in the First
Department of New York reported between 1920 and 1944.123 Using the admittedly unscientific
(but unavoidable) technique of identifying ethnicity by surname, I found of the 64 opinions (out of
74) in which counsels= names appear, that 37 involved Jewish lawyers opposing non-Jewish
lawyers, 13 involved Jewish lawyers on both sides, and 13 involved non-Jewish lawyers on both
sides, with one in which there was a substantial mix of ethnicity on both sides. While hardly
conclusive (and while it has never been my claim that derivative litigation was the exclusive
province of Jewish lawyers), the fact that 50% of the cases involved Jews against non-Jews, and
another 17% involved Jews alone, for a total of 67% of the derivative suit cases brought by Jewish
lawyers, seems to provide good support for my conclusion. This of course says nothing about the
ethnicity of the management of the defendant corporations, although, as we saw above, most large
firms did not represent a Jewish clientele, and Jewish businesses were rather limited in type and
nature.124
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One might expect small practice Jewish lawyers to have heavily engaged in personal injury litigation,
often against WASP-controlled insurance companies, and that this too would be viewed with offense by the WASP
establishment. Note first that it is virtually impossible to bring a personal injury Astrike suit.@ Typically the injury will
be apparent. Moreover, a random sampling of 200 personal injury cases between 1900 and 1945 revealed obviously
Jewish lawyers in fewer than 10% of cases, although Jews did appear most often for the plaintiff.
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Obviously this is a flawed enterprise in light of the relatively small number of derivative suit cases that
reached trial and as to which an opinion was written, but it is the best I can do on the data available.
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In addition to the evidence already presented, see Abraham K. Korman, THE OUTSIDERS: JEWS AND
CORPORATE AMERICA (1988) (evaluating the absence of Jews from the managerial ranks of most established
corporations and their relatively greater presence in entrepreneurial corporations and the professions.)
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The truth of the conclusion that the push to restrict derivative litigation was motivated by
antisemitism is poignantly brought home by an article published in the Michigan Law Review in
1937 by Harris Berlack, a Jewish member of the New York bar.125 The article begins by
acknowledging both the paucity of studies of the methods of enforcing shareholders= rights and the
general disrepute in which the derivative suit was held, despite the fact that it was the only
significant process available for the enforcement of those rights. As Berlack puts it: Athe
stockholders= suit is universally reviled.@126 Why? Not because it was easy for plaintiffs. Berlack
discusses the hurdles faced by a stockholder plaintiff and his lawyer, detailing the expense, risk,
and difficulty of succeeding. Having done so, he then comes to the point which, while coded,
smacks undeniably of the taint of antisemitism underlying the Auniversal@ hostility to shareholder
litigation. Let me illustrate using Berlack=s own words:
AIn the sort of case under consideration, however, the labor involved is so great and the
outcome so uncertain that the leaders of the bar are seldom inclined to take the gamble. This
leaves the field to the younger and less experienced or to the less successful and sometimes less
scrupulous members of the profession. Plaintiffs, as a consequence, find it difficult to obtain
proper representation; and defendants must oppose tactics which are not always the most ethical,
or, at the least, are subjected to an attack which is unnecessarily and unpleasantly belligerent.@127
AFor the abuse heaped upon the >strikers= there may be ample justification. Unfortunately, those
constantly affiliated with large corporate interests have developed the habit of placing all
complaining stockholders in the same category.@128
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Harris Berlack, Stockholders= Suits: A Possible Substitute, 35 Michigan L. Rev. 597 (1937). One can, as
I choose to do giving Mr. Berlack the benefit of the doubt, see this piece as poignant. One can also see it, less
charitably, as a classic example of Uncle-Tomism.
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Id. at 599.
Id. at 603 (emphasis added).
Id. at 605 (emphasis added).
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ASo intensified has become the rancor of this attitude, that the upstart who dares to question
the conduct of corporate affairs is cast outside the pale of common decency.@129
AThe viciousness of such attacks [of plaintiffs and their counsel] militates against their very
purpose; it insures that stockholders= suits will be instituted and conducted, as a rule, only by those
who are most impervious to abuse B and hence capable of the most objectionable conduct.@130
There=s more. More is not needed. We already know who the Aleaders of the bar@ and the
Aless successful@ lawyers were. Why should the fact that the latter were the ones willing to take on
these suits lead to their revilement? AUnnecessarily and unpleasantly belligerent attacks@? An
unpleasantly belligerent nature is one of the classic old antisemitic saws. APlacing all complaining
stockholders in the same category@? That sounds awfully like stereotyping, and given the facts as
we know them, the Acategory@ into which all of these lawyers were put is obvious. AUpstart@? Of
course these would be people who impertinently attempt to rise above their station or interfere with
the activities of their betters.131 ACast outside the pale@? The Pale of Settlement (while a borrowed
term) consisted of the western areas at the edges of Russia in which Jews were permitted to live.
To be outside the pale was to be completely ostracized. AThose who are most impervious to
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Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 606 (emphasis added).
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Upstart indeed. John Higham illustrates this nicely: AAnd discrimination reflected, as it had for fifty
years, a conjunction of two factors: the great but insecure inequalities of a middle class society in which men striving
for distinction feared inundation; and the urgent pressure which the Jews, as an exceptionally ambitious immigrant
people, put upon some of the more crowded rungs of the social ladder.@ John Higham,. Social Discrimination
Against Jews in America, 1830-1930, in V THE JEWISH EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA (Abraham J. Karp, ed., 1969), 349,
371. And Higham goes on, describing discrimination in the period immediately before that of the Wood Report as
caused by Astatus panic@, id., and sees the very success of the Jews as the cause of social antisemitism. AWhereas
other European groups generally gained respect as assimilation improved their stature, the Jews reaped more and
more dislike as they bettered themselves,@ id. at 376, and AUnfavorable stereotypes have pictured an overbearing
Jewish ability to gain advantage in American life. Only one other important immigrant group B the Japanese B has
normally been disliked for its strength rather than its weakness.@ Id. It is the temerity of Jews to challenge their
betters that led to the Auniversal revilement@ of derivative litigation.
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abuse@? Why? Because the contempt in which they are already held makes the marginal pain of
further abuse insignificant, especially for the starving lawyer trying to make a living.
The coding is thin. Mr. Berlack, a Jew and New York plaintiffs= lawyer, does not want to
be tarred with the same brush as his colleagues, and uses the very language of coded antisemitism
to protest his own innocence. Combined with Berlack=s (perhaps unintentional) self-revelation, the
rhetoric of the Wood Report tells us exactly why derivative suits were considered to be such a
significant problem, despite the reality of their relative innocence and the lack of serious scholarly
concern with the issue. That reason is the irritation and vexation felt by WASP lawyers and their
WASP clients at having to defend themselves against the annoying and decidedly low life Aupstart@
Jews who were demanding an equality which the WASP aristocracy was unwilling to grant them.
It is counterfactual, but had the challenge of derivative litigation come from WASP B or at least
Christian B lawyers, the empirical evidence suggests that there=s a least a good chance that
derivative litigation would not have been so Auniversally despised@ and that any problems could
have been worked out through a Agentleman=s agreement.@132 Recall the substantially better
educational opportunities for low status Protestants and the equivalent career opportunities for law
achieving Protestants compared with high achieving Jews.133 And it=s not just the empirical
evidence.
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Or it could have been that poorer relation WASP lawyers would have been reluctant to take on such
suits because they had a very real opportunity to rise in status within the bar, an opportunity not available to Jewish
lawyers.
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and accompanying text.

50

I recall beginning my career at a large, Awhite-shoe@ New York law firm in 1981.134 During
my first year, I was taken under the wing of one of the senior (WASP) partners and taught to do an
initial public offering. We spent a great deal of time together, both in the office and traveling back
and forth to our client in Boston. As we were sitting alone in a Boston restaurant one night, well
into the transaction and thus our relationship (and well into a couple of drinks) this partner paused,
looked at me, and, smilingly said: AMitchell, I like you. You can=t be Jewish. You=ve got to be
Irish.@135 Irish B although almost assuredly Catholic B would have been all right. Jewish simply
was unacceptable.
The kind of discrimination that led to the Wood Report could well have been overt and
intentional, or it could have been, and likely was, more subtle. Laura Z. Hobson=s wonderful
period novel, Gentleman=s Agreement, 136 describes antisemitism in New York among Athe better
sort@ at the height of its American rise, the 1940s. Dramatizing the same psychological forces that
Charles Lawrence describes as unconscious racism, 137 Hobson shows the socially unacceptable
status of even assimilated Eastern European Jews, and the psychologically subtle, subconscious
defenses for discriminatory practice even among those horrified to be called antisemitic, as well as
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Not Paul Weiss which I mentioned supra at note __, and to which I later went.
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Of course that was the day I decided to leave the firm. To be fair, this partner clearly liked me and gave
me wonderful references for subsequent jobs. The simple fact (and pain) of the antidote is that he (coincidentally, a
Bronxville resident) had trouble coming to grips with the fact that he so liked a Jew.
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Laura Z. Hobson, GENTLEMAN=S AGREEMENT (1946). The novel was made into an Academy Award
winning movie starring Gregory Peck, Celeste Holm, and John Garfield.
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Lawrence, supra note __.
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the kind of pain it inflicted, the very kind of pain that could well have led to Mr. Berlack=s pleas of
difference.138
A 1955 article in Look magazine, entitled The Position of the Jews in America Today,
pretty much sums things up.139 The author, highly sympathetic to American Jews and critical of
antisemitism, could still ask such questions, revealing ancient antisemitic allegations, as AWhy are
there so many Jewish organizations?@ (evidently forgetting Tocqueville=s description of America as
a society of organizations), and AWhat makes Jews so clannish?@ He could still make such
affirmative statements as AJews do tend to be clannish . . . .@, AFor centuries, the Jews were misfits .
. .@, Asome Jews . . . tend to be over aggressive@, Aa great many are hypersensitive in their relations
with Gentiles@ and, perhaps most astonishing of all and apparently as evidence of this last
statement, AThey seem to have a special exposed nerve that registers every tremor of prejudice like
a seismograph: Let a Gentile use an idiomatic phrase like >He jewed me down,= and every Jew
within earshot will mark him as a bigot.@140
More objectively, the author could point out the continued discrimination against Jewish
students in Athe majority@ of fraternities and sororities, quotas at medical schools and virtual
exclusion from engineering schools, the substantial persistence of overt employment
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For an earlier and cruder depiction of the exclusion of even upper-class Jewry in the character of the
Princeton- educated Robert Cohn, see Ernest Hemingway, THE SUN ALSO RISES (1926).
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Recall that this is five years before the data reported by Carlin. William Attwood, The Position of the
Jews in America Today, 19 Look, No. 24, November 29, 1955.
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It is worth noting that language, even metaphorical, that describes Jews as having a Aspecial exposed
nerve@ reinforces the idea of antisemitism as rooted in race or biology.
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discrimination against Jews, and the fact that, Aamong real estate brokers in certain areas, there is a
tacit agreement not to sell to Jews.@
It=s hard to prove crude antisemitism as the cause of any discrimination against Jews, and
Hobson illustrates this nicely in her book (although the author of the Look article unintentionally
does a good job). Few people of the level of sophistication and education that characterized the
eastern WASP upper classes would have been so ill-mannered as to proclaim outright their dislike
of Jews and their attribution to Jews of unpleasant characteristics. (One of the ironies in Hobson=s
novel is that the protagonist, Phil Green, is a Stanford-educated, California-raised WASP reporter
who poses as a Jew in New York society for the purpose of understanding, and writing about,
antisemitism. He is tarred with precisely the same brush, and has precisely the same characteristics
attributed to him, as other AJews@, simply as a result of identifying himself as Jewish.) It was the
Jewishness of the plaintiff=s bar that caused the derivative suit to assume crisis proportions among
the WASP corporate and legal elite.
Waste or Class?
The second two reasons in defense of section 61-b, that derivative suits generally were
meretricious and that recovery was so de minimus as to make them a waste of time, fall on the
explanation I gave earlier. While I have not read every derivative suit opinion from this period, the
data seem clear that derivative suits did not deviate terribly significantly from the norm for
plaintiffs= litigation, rendering both of these explanations implausible.
There is one other possible argument that transcends antisemitism as an explanation for
why derivative suits were viewed as so threatening, an argument that is highlighted by Carlin=s
conclusions that ethical behavior was a function of bar status. That is to suggest that the animosity
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was less driven by hatred of Jews than by class differences. But this answer is difficult, if
impossible, to sustain. Were it the case that the plaintiffs= bar was made up largely of Irish and
Italian lawyers, the class story might be plausible. But it wasn=t. And so the argument has the
initial weakness of being entirely counterfactual. Of course there was elite discrimination against
these ethnic groups. But not only did it never come close to reaching the extent of antisemitism;141
they were ethnic groups that were themselves participants in the virulent antisemitism that was
pervasive during the era of the Wood Report and, for the most part at that time had their own
defined economic roles in the trades, the police, politics, civil service, and shopkeeping which,
while somewhat humble, were never the province of the Protestant elite.142 More important, if
class were the issue, then it should have been the case that lower-class Protestant lawyers were
treated as poorly as Jewish lawyers, from their matriculation into college until their admission to
the bar and employment in firms. But the evidence we=ve already examined suggests just the
opposite. Lower-class Protestants, and particularly academically unsuccessful lower class
Protestants, had almost the same chances to attain elite legal status as did wealthy and
academically successful Jews, whereas poor and academically unsuccessful Jews had almost no
chance at all. Finally, it is worth repeating that, as Baltzell sees it, the WASP elite largely defined
itself in opposition to Eastern European Jewry to a far greater extent than the negligible notice
taken of other ethnic minorities. The class argument falls apart on the facts.143

141

John Higham, Social Discrimination Against Jews in America, 1830-1930, in V THE JEWISH
EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA (Abraham J. Karp, ed., 1969), 349, 375-6.
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Just Who Can You Trust These Days ?
It seems obvious from the tone of the Wood Report and its conclusions that the Jewish
plaintiffs= bar was completely distrusted by elite lawyers. The general environment of the New
York bar, the more broadly national discussions of ethics codes144 and practices that tended to
disparage and show distrust of plaintiffs= lawyers in general, and the ways in which those ethics
rules did their best to limit the business of Jewish lawyers, further support this conclusion. Section
61-b was designed precisely on the basis of that mistrust. The Wood Report=s implicit, and
sometimes explicit, argument is that grasping and unscrupulous (Jewish) plaintiffs= lawyers were
threatening the health of corporate America, a corporate America run by Athe best men@ society
could produce.145
In light of that, it is worth asking whether the evidence supports greater trustworthiness in
corporate America than in the plaintiffs= bar. Fortunately, we have both contemporaneous and
then-relatively recent historical evidence to draw upon in assessing this question.
Two famous pieces of literature present themselves. The first, because roughly
contemporaneous with these attitudes towards plaintiffs= lawyers and published not all that long
before 61-b was enacted, is the Pecora Report which investigated the banking and securities
industry abuses of the 1920s which contributed to the Crash of >29 and the Great Depression. (We

stretches far back into history and well before the history with which this article is concerned. However, the
confluence of mistrust of lawyers and mistrust of Jews appears to have morphed into the antisemitic impulses of the
bar. Marc Galanter points out that AA large portion of the [lawyer] jokes in the betrayal cluster are adapted from
jokes that were predominantly told about Jews.@ Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers In
Public Opinion, Jokes, and Political Discourse, 66 U. Cin. L. Rev. 805, 827 (1998).
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John Sproat, THE BEST MEN: LIBERAL REFORMERS IN THE GILDED AGE (1968); E. Merrick Dodd, For
Whom are Managers Trustees?, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1145 (1932).
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also have the benefit of a 1939 book written by Ferdinand Pecora, analyzing the extent to which
corporate America had failed to reform in the wake of those hearings and the resultant enactment
of the federal securities laws.)146
The second is the earlier report of the Pujo Commission147 following the Panic of 1907
which led to the passage of the Federal Reserve Act and the Clayton Act.148 The work of the Pujo
Commission revealed a web of central and highly concentrated power over American industry by a
small group of men, specifically in the American (WASP-dominated and WASP-represented)
finance industry.
It might be worth beginning by quoting the words of Ferdinand Pecora in his 1939
assessment of the success of the securities laws in curbing corporate abuses:
Under the surface of the governmental regulation of the securities market, the same forces
that produced the riotous speculative excesses of the Awild bull market@ of 1929 still give
evidences of their existence and influence. Though repressed for the present, it cannot be doubted
that, given a suitable opportunity, they would spring back into pernicious activity.
Frequently we are told that this regulation has been throttling the country=s prosperity.
Bitterly hostile was Wall Street to the enactment of the regulatory legislation. It now looks
forward to the day when it shall, as it hopes, reassume the reins of its former power.
That its leaders are eminently fitted to guide our nation, and that they would make a much
better job of it than any other body of men, Wall Street does not for a moment doubt. Indeed, if
you now hearken to the oracles of The Street, you will hear now and then that the money-changers
146
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have been much maligned. You will be told that a whole group of high-minded men, innocent of
social or economic wrongdoing, were expelled from the temple because of the excesses of a few. . .
These disingenuous protestations are, in the crisp legal phrase, without merit. The case
against the money- changers does not rest upon hearsay or surmise. It is based upon a mass of
evidence, given publicly and under oath before the Banking and Currency Committee of the United
States Senate in 1933-1934, by The Street=s mightiest and best-informed men. Their testimony is
recorded in twelve thousand printed pages . . . .
The public, however, is sometimes forgetful.149
Granted that Pecora had a legacy to protect, the evidence assembled by the Commission
was overwhelming. Wall Street simply was not to be trusted. And Wall Street controlled
corporate America.
The same conclusions are even clearer in the Pujo Commission report, which includes
elaborate tables detailing the extent to which major financial institutions had interlocking
directorates across the scope of corporate America. To quote a summary of the report=s findings:
The firm members and directors whose affiliations are thus shown number 180. In the
aggregate they hold 385 directorships in 41 banks and trust companies . . .50 directorships in 11
insurance companies . . .155 directorships in 31 railroad systems . . . 6 directorships in 2 express
companies and 4 directorships in 1 steamship company . . .98 directorships in 28 producing and
trading corporations . . . and 48 directorships in 19 public utility corporations . . . in all, 746
directorships in 134 corporations having total resources or capitalization of $25,325,000,000.150
By itself, the fact that a small group of men in the American financial industry controlled
all other major industries doesn=t mean they were untrustworthy. It does suggest, however, that
nobody was watching them but themselves. If nothing else, this should underscore the need for
some kind of watchdog, and the only available one at the time was the plaintiffs= lawyer acting as
private attorney general. Even after the passage of the Federal Reserve Act, the Clayton Act, the
149
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Glass-Steagall Act, and the securities laws, significant corporate abuses continued as Pecora
reports.151
So why trust corporate managers? They=d already let America down in very significant
ways B twice in twenty years.152 And, as I noted above, derivative litigation was a very small part
of judicial business and the securities class action hadn=t even been invented yet. What reason did
the New York elite bar, Chamber of Commerce, and legislature have to assume that plaintiffs=
lawyers were generally less trustworthy than corporate managers? It would appear that they had
none, except the deep mistrust of the mostly Jewish plaintiffs= bar which went with American
antisemitism in general.
It isn=t quite so easy just to leave things at this point though. As I noted earlier, the purpose
of the Carlin report was to examine the ethical behavior of New York lawyers. We=ve already seen
the stratification of the bar which remained consistent between 1939 and Carlin=s work. Carlin
concludes in his study that understanding the stratification of the bar is Aessential@ to understanding
the forces that determine lawyers= ethical behavior.153
Here Jewish lawyers fared less well. Carlin concludes that in general large firm lawyers
whom, as we have seen, were mostly WASP, were more likely to conform to explicit ethical norms
than smaller firm lawyers whom we have seen were more likely to be Jewish. From this one might
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conclude that it was indeed rational to distrust the plaintiffs= bar. But not so fast. For Carlin
concludes:
Viewed alone, . . . [the data] suggests a direct connection between cultural or religious
characteristics and conformity with ethical norms. However, further analysis of the data indicates
that the significance of ethnicity is largely confined to the role it plays in allocating lawyers to
different status positions in the bar and in exposing them to different pressures.154
In other words, Carlin found that when lawyers of different ethnicity were of equal status in the
bar, ethnicity was Avirtually eliminated@ as a factor in ethical compliance.155 The extent that Jewish
lawyers were more likely to violate explicit ethical norms than Protestant lawyers is a clear
function of the stratification of the bar based on antisemitism.
Even if Jews were more likely to violate explicit ethical norms, can we conclude that they
were intrinsically less trustworthy? Two other aspects of the ethical dimension suggest not, and
further suggest that their ethical violations were for the most part far more innocuous than the
social and economic damage wrought by corporate managers and their counsel. The first aspect is
the type of ethical rules that lower-status lawyers tended to violate, none of which go the issues
raised in the Wood Report nor are likely to be relevant in a sophisticated, large firm corporate
practice. The second is the fact that the ethics rules themselves were drafted on a rather explicit
background of antisemitism, and that many of the rules (such as the prohibition on advertising)
were explicitly designed to damage the prospects of Jewish lawyers and thereby discourage them
from becoming members of the bar in the first place.
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First let=s look at the types of ethical violations used in the study. Before doing so, it is
worth remembering that the ethics rules we are dealing with are not rules of morality, but are
instead positive rules that were constructed and adopted by the bar. As every law student comes to
understand, the ethics rules are even sometimes counterintuitive, and are designed to permit
consistent self-regulation of the bar. As I=ll shortly describe, some of the ethical violations Carlin
uses are clearly wrong and indefensible under any system of ethics. Others are more ambiguous,
obviously arising from the need to make a living under the circumstances I earlier described. Still
others have little if any moral content (like the prohibition on advertising) and may themselves
derive from wrongful policies, like creating barriers to entry to prevent excessive competition.
I lack the space to explain in detail all of Carlin=s categories,156 but a brief listing of them
should at least indicate the nature of the violations. Recited like the ten plagues visited upon Egypt
at the Passover Seder, they are: kickbacks to clients for referral of other clients, conflicts of
interest, purchasing stock in a corporation to which the assets of a bankrupt client corporation are
to be transferred, sending Christmas cards to all clients, overlooking a client=s bribe of a tax or
other governmental official, accepting ordinary commissions from title insurance companies
without informing the client, recommending an Aalmost fair@ settlement offer to client in exchange
for future concessions from the insurance adjuster, accepting a referral fee from another lawyer,
misinforming client as to the weakness of the state=s case against him to ensure continued
installments on fees, agreeing to take divorce case where parties agree to consent decree on the
basis of adultery although no adultery was committed (adultery being the only ground for divorce
in New York), following client=s instructions to disregard oral agreement with other lawyer in
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order to take a better deal, bribing police to get charge of homosexuality against Apromising youth@
removed from records, and insider trading.157
As one can readily see, some of the actions that are considered violations (having the
records purged of charges of a dubious crime for a Apromising youth@, referral fees, the divorce
consent decree, and sending Christmas cards to clients) are at least morally defensible. Some of
these are also based on ethical restrictions that are downright anticompetitive (referral fees,
Christmas cards). Others, while violations of a client=s trust, are not seriously wrongful (accepting
a normal title insurance commission without disclosure). Most of the others are unambiguously
wrong, but one can see their clear relationship to a lawyers= ability to survive. One can also see that
the situations in which most of these violations occur wouldn=t even come up in the large firm
corporate context. And it should be quite clear that none of these violations relate to the kinds of
issues that come up in derivative litigation. Thus the implication that corporate managers are
somehow more trustworthy than plaintiffs= lawyers seems to fail, especially when the serious
national economic damage those corporate managers caused during the first thirty years of the
previous century and the beginning of this one is compared with the relatively petty nature of most
of the ethical offenses identified above.
Class Actions
The second type of stockholder litigation which has been subjected to significant
restrictions is that under the federal securities laws and, most importantly, section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The reason for discussing class actions, despite the
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fact that all of the hard evidence relates to derivative suits, is because class actions effectively
supplanted derivative suits as the principle means by which stockholders seek redress. As such,
they have been subject to the same opprobrium as derivative suits, and indeed it is class action
suits which were the target of the 1995 Act.
As with derivative litigation, the issue on which I=d like to focus is standing to sue (the
securities for expense statute can be seen as a standing matter since a plaintiff who fails to comply
loses his standing to sue.) Under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, it is unlawful for any person Ato use
or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance@ that contravenes SEC rules (rule 10b-5 being the operational
rule). Prior to 1975, the federal courts, principally the Second Circuit where most securities
litigation took place, and the Supreme Court, had been struggling to flesh out the meaning of this
rather cryptic enabling statute (and the equally cryptic rule.) Both courts, however, were guided by
the general policy that since the securities acts were remedial in nature, they were to be liberally
interpreted. In general, although the courts did impose reasonable restrictions, it=s fair to say that
they were in fact liberally interpreted.
From 1975 on, it=s equally fair to say that the Supreme Courts= securities jurisprudence has
been an aggressive and unprincipled cutting back on plaintiffs= rights under the securities laws.
The landmark case (symbolizing the real start of the cutback) was Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores158 in which then-Justice Rehnquist, in his only securities law opinion, wrote an
incoherent opinion (based on none of the briefs in the case) largely turning on the fear of
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Avexatious litigation@, a phrase that rings with the tones of distrust we=ve been following through
the second part of the twentieth century.159
Following Blue Chip were cases in which the Court limited defendants= liability under the
>33 Act by, among other things, defining a Aprospectus@ (as to which legal action could be taken) as
not a prospectus, limiting the statute of limitations under the antifraud rules of the >34 Act to a total
of three years from the fraud (regardless of the fact that the essence of fraud is concealment and it
is more than possible to take longer than three years to uncover a business fraud), eliminating
liability for misleading proxy statements if the proxy statement was sent voluntarily by the
company rather than legally mandated, and eliminating aiding and abetting liability under the >34
Act antifraud provisions (which was the principal way plaintiffs were able to hold lawyers and
accountants liable for fraud under the Act, a questionable move at the time and one made even
more so by the Enron debacle). 160
The low point of the cutback was, however, brought to us by Congress, in its passage of
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. While there are many aspects of that statute
to criticize, including procedural devices to restrict the number of plaintiffs= firms that can bring
suit, the most troubling aspects of the statute are a heightened state of mind requirement (plaintiff
must prove that defendant knew of the fraud instead of the earlier mere recklessness, surely a very
difficult task in most cases), the elimination of joint and several liability by the apportionment of
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of property, the deed of which contained a restrictive covenant against sales to Jews. At the very least this suggests
gross insensitivity.
160

See Lawrence E. Mitchell, No Business Like No Business, in THE REHNQUIST COURT, (Herman
Schwartz, ed. forthcoming 2002) for a discussion of these cases.
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fault with a corresponding limitation on damages (thus further creating financial disincentives for
plaintiffs to sue), unusually burdensome pleading requirements (almost impossible to meet before
discovery), and protection from the antifraud rules for forward - looking statements by a
corporation as long as the statement is qualified by a phrase suggesting that it be taken with a grain
of salt (hardly a difficult task for corporations to meet and protecting misleading statements
completely.)161
I=m not going to claim that this Act, like the New York statute, was proximately caused by
antisemitism. Both the demographics of the bar and our social norms have changed far too
dramatically to make that assertion sustainable. But there are some interesting aspects of the Act
and its passage which suggest that the attitudes which prompted it are not far removed from the
antisemitism that led to section 61-b.
The 1995 Act was a legacy of the Contract with America, the brainchild of Newt Gingrich
in his attempt to take over the House of Representatives during the 1994 mid-term elections.
Among the actions under the Contract promised by its signatories within the first 100 days of the
104th Congress was the so-called ACommon Sense Legal Reform Act@, which included both reform
of products liability litigation and the 1995 Act. Products liability litigation reform, while it
initially passed, could not override the President=s veto. The 1995 Act passed, overriding President
Clinton=s veto, on a vote of 68-30 in the Senate (with 20 Democrats voting in favor) and 319-100-1
in the House (with 89 Democrats voting in favor). Particularly unusual, as I earlier mentioned, is
that a review of the legislative history of the 1995 Act reveals virtually no empirical evidence as to
the losses (including virtually no evidence of the loss to corporate productivity), if any, caused by
161

P.L. 104-67 (1995).
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stockholder litigation, and absolutely no empirical evidence as to the benefits.162 Of course there
are strike suits, and limitations on them are important. But there is no hard evidence that the
limitations in this act were anything but overkill. Why did such a poorly conceived bill pass, and
why this and not products liability legislation as well?163
For one thing, the 1995 Act was at least in large part passed because of the enormous
lobbying pressure brought to bear on Congress by Silicon Valley corporations, corporations the
stock volatility and failure rate of which was much higher than the norm and the executives of
which wanted protection from lawsuits filed every time their stock price dropped ten percent. But
this can=t be the entire explanation, for high tech corporations are geographically concentrated and
corporations subject to products liability suits are located throughout the country. It should have
been the case, then, that Congress was subject to at least as much pressure (or at least pressure
more broadly felt) in the products liability area than in the securities area.164
Another possibility is that personal injury plaintiffs= lawyers also are located throughout the
United States, whereas stockholders= plaintiffs= lawyers are concentrated in a very few cities,
especially in the northeast and most particularly in New York where the acknowledged principal
target of the legislation, the largely Jewish Milberg, Weiss, has its main office. Most
162

Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. Dav. L. Rev. 903 at n. 57.
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It is important to remember that both pieces of legislation were part of the Republican Contract with
America, a House-generated document, and to note that not a single House Republican voted against the override of
the President=s veto of the 1995 Act. (A very few Senate Republicans voted against the override.)
Also note that while the House mustered 319 votes to override the President=s veto of the 1995 Act, only
258 votes were cast in the House to override the veto of the products liability reform act. This removed almost all
Democrats from the override, leaving it to the House Republicans whose public commitment it was to pass that act.
164

Of course it=s possible the high tech industry was better organized, and that it also spread its campaign
largess over a far broader sweep than Northern California.
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congresspeople would have very little concern with such a localized interest group, where they
would be much more concerned with the kinds of lawyers that practiced in their own districts.
So simple public choice explanations could suffice.
But the rush to legislate on this subject, and the contempt for plaintiffs= lawyers obvious in
the hearings records, suggests another possibility. Not explicit antisemitism. But perhaps an
attitude, the origins of which would not likely have been visible to Congress, an attitude arising in
the very antisemitism that led to section 61-b.165
Racism? Not necessarily. Jody Armour has made the interesting argument that stereotypes
persist even in the minds of low - prejudiced people long after prejudice itself is gone.166 And to
read the record of the hearings is to see the repeated stereotype of the grasping, unscrupulous
plaintiffs= lawyer. If this is the case, at least with respect to most of those who voted in favor of the
bill (for, as I noted, they had almost no hard information on which to vote), it is less troubling than
is the passage of Section 61-b, but does call for a conscious examination of the origins of these
stereotypes and, as we can see with respect to the 1995 Act, it leads us to reactive rather than
considered public policy. So stereotypes, even deracinated ones, are harmful enough.
But was there no antisemitism? The repeated litany of the Jewish names of the members of
the plaintiffs= securities bar at least raises a question, at least with respect to some congresspeople
(I have nobody particular in mind.) Racism can be unconscious. It can be conscious. But
conscious or unconscious, it is beyond dispute that the burden of the 1995 Act fell quite
165

It is interesting to note that Senator Boxer, a Jew from Northern California where Silicon Valley is
located, voted neither for the original bill nor the override, presumably at some political peril from her wealthy
constituents who were lobbying so vociferously for its passage.
166

Armour, supra note __.
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disproportionately upon urban, and especially New York, Jewish lawyers. The echoes of 1944
should at least make us stop and think.

Appendix A
Jewish Census Information
Demographics in 19371

Manhattan
Brooklyn
Bronx
Queens
Richmond (Later
Staten Island)
Total New York City

Jewish Population
General Population3
Estimate (American
(American Jewish
Jewish Yearbook
Yearbook 1937)
2
1937)
351,037
1,870,225
974,765
2,630,456
592,185
1,349,621
107,855
1,227,659
9,158
167,354
2,035,000

Percent Jewish

7,245,315

18.77%
37.06%
43.88%
8.79%
5.47%
28.09%

1

Jacob Rader Marcus has done extensive research on the Jewish people in America. Among his research
data, he has found data on populations of Jews in various cities in the United States. See Marcus, Jacob Rader: TO
COUNT A PEOPLE: AMERICAN JEWISH POPULATION DATA, 1585-1984 (University Press of America Boston 1990),
Page 139 for NY State.
Marcus cites Universal Jewish Encyclopedia in an estimate that 2,100,000 Jews lived in New York City in 1939. No
numbers or estimates were available for each of the boroughs for 1939. However, Marcus cites American Jewish
Yearbook for 1937 numbers broken down by borough. For 1940, Marcus cites Horowitz and Kaplan for a borough
breakdown. For the number of Jews, the 1940 numbers only add up to 1,784,000 (Marcus citing Horowitz and
Kaplan). Note that Horowitz and Kaplan were far more conservative on the number of Jews in NYC than AJYB.
However, both primary sources (AJYB and Horowitz/Kaplan) seem to be experts on Jewish populations in the
United States, so it is unclear whose numbers would be most accurate.
2

By backtracking the American Jewish Yearbook=s numbers, it seems that AJYB created its estimates of
the Jewish population using a top down method. Taking arbitrarily chosen percentages times the total estimated
number of Jews in New York City (2,035,000), the authors simply allocated the Jews among the five boroughs. The
percentages used are as follows: Manhattan 17.25%, Brooklyn 47.90%, Bronx 29.10%, Queens 5.30%, and
Richmond (Staten Island) 0.45%.
3

AGeneral Population@, as used in these tables, refers to the population of New York.
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1940 Demographics

Manhattan
Brooklyn
Bronx
Queens
Richmond (Later
Staten Island)
Total New York City

Jewish Population
General Population
Estimate
(1940 U.S. Census)
(Horowitz/Kaplan)
270,000
1,889,924
857,000
2,698,285
538,000
1,394,711
115,000
1,297,634
4,000
174,441
1,784,000

7,454,995

68

Percent Jewish

14.29%
31.76%
38.57%
8.86%
2.29%
23.93%

1960 Demographics1

Manhattan
Brooklyn
Bronx
Queens
Richmond (Later
Staten Island)
Total New York City

Population Estimate
General Population
of Jewish People
(1960 U.S. Census)
(American Jewish
Yearbook 1960)
293,000
1,698,281
794,000
2,627,319
432,000
1,424,815
408,000
1,809,578
10,000
221,991
1,937,000

7,781,984

1

Percent Jewish

17.25%
30.22%
30.32%
22.55%
4.50%
24.89%

For Carlin=s year (1960), much more information was found. The Marcus data for 1960 cites AJYB, and
the total population data comes from the U.S. Census taken in 1960.
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Appendix B
Law Schools Attended by Jewish Lawyers1, 1939
Law School
Brooklyn Law School
New York University
New York Law School
Columbia
St. John=s
Fordham
Harvard
Yale
Cornell
Others
Not Indicated

1

Number
773
679
364
329
322
188
122
27
23
48
112

Percentage
25.8
22.7
12.1
11.0
10.7
6.2
4.0
0.9
0.7
1.6
3.7

Fagen at 97.
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Appendix C
Types of Principal Clients and Median 1939 Incomes of Jewish Lawyers1
Type of Principal
Clients
Banks
Stock Brokers
Corporations
Theatrical, Radio
Trade Associations
Trade Unions
Insurance
Companies and
Brokers
Garment Industry
General
Manufacturers
Real Estate
Building Trades
Merchants
Wage Earners and
Small Shopkeepers
Person Charged
with Crimes
Others

1

Number of
Lawyers
Reporting
51
15
419
16
13
23
26

Percentage of
Lawyers
Reporting
1.72%
0.51%
14.12%
0.54%
0.44%
0.77%
0.88%

Median Income
(1937 Dollars)
7,604
5,938
4,968
4,333
4,250
4,000
3,800

Median
Income (2002
Dollars)
97,812.32
76,382.11
63,904.74
55,736.56
54,668.91
51,453.09
48,880.43

103
783
42
192
20
1252
251

3.47%
26.38%
1.42%
6.47%
0.67%
42.18%
8.46%

3,684
2,910
2,800
2,725
2,400
2,352
1,414

47,388.29
37,432.12
36,017.16
35,052.42
30,871.85
30,254.42
18,188.67

31

1.04%

1,281

16,477.85

184

6.20%

2,706

34,808.01

Fagen at 99.
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Appendix D
Median 1939 Income of Jewish Lawyers Classified by Organization of Law Practice1
Organization of
Practice

Number
Reporting

Percentage

Median Income
(1937 Dollars)

Solo Practitioner
Head of Office
Member of Firm
Employee of Firm
Employed on
Legal Staff of
Business
Total for Jewish
Lawyers

1,752
192
429
411
88

61.00%
6.69%
14.94%
14.31%
3.06%

1,874
8,879
4,137
2,157
3,960

Median
Income
(2002 Dollars)
24,105
114,213
53,215
27,745
50,939

2,872

100.00%

2,426

31,206

1

Fagen at 96.
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Appendix E
Organization of Legal Practice by Years of Practice for Jewish Lawyers and General New York
City Bar1, 1939
Years of
Practice
0-4
5-10
11-16
17-23
24-34
35+

Single
Practitioners
J
G
54.35 40.59
69.29 42.46
64.65 35.45
57.93 36.53
58.81 29.85
41.66 29.43

Heads of
Offices
J
G
1.04
7.91
2.46
14.38
7.40
20.90
15.45 18.75
21.26 33.38
28.12 27.93

Firm Members

Employees

J
34.85
18.06
8.00
4.29
2.71
1.04

J
9.74
11.82
19.93
22.31
17.19
29.16

G
12.23
21.00
32.38
35.34
31.53
39.62

AJ@ stands for Jewish lawyers, and AG@ stands for general membership of the Bar.

1

Fagen at 101.
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G
39.27
22.16
11.27
9.38
5.24
3.02

Appendix F
Median Net Incomes for Jewish Lawyers (1937) and General Bar Membership (1933) According to
Experience1
Years of Practice Jewish Lawyers
(1937 Dollars)
0-4
1,031
5-10
2,070
11-16
3,408
17-23
5,378
24-34
4,907
34+
5,000

1

Jewish Lawyers
(2002 Dollars)
13,262.03
26,626.97
43,838.03
69,178.68
63,120.08
64,316.36

Fagen at 92.
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General Lawyers
(1933 Dollars)
1,794
3,164
5,547
6,647
6,572
8,068

General Lawyers
(2002 Dollars)
24,812.40
43,760.56
76,719.28
91,933.13
90,895.82
111,586.70

Appendix G
Nativity of Jewish Lawyers and of General New York City Bar Membership, 19391
Nativity
Native-Born
Foreign-Born
Not Specified

1

Jewish (%)
68.6%
17.8%
13.5%

General (%)
80.8%
18.6%
0.6%

Fagen at 79.
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Appendix H
Type of College Attended by Religion and Social Class Background, 19601

Religion

Protestant
Jewish
Catholic

1

Percent of lawyers who attended an Ivy League or top-quality
college outside New York City
High Parental SES
Middle Parental
Low Parental SES
SES
Percent
Number Percent
Number Percent
Number
70
64
42
12
28
18
34
169
17
133
9
211
19
47
10
21
10
52

Carlin at 29.
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Appendix I
Membership in Large Firms by Type of Law School, Law School Standing, and Religion1, 1960
Type of Law School

Protestant
%

Full-Time
University

Mixed Law
School

1

Law
Review
All
Others
Law
Review
All
Others

Catholic

#

%

Jewish
#

Percent

Number

69

13

0

5

11

27

26

54

40

20

8

116

0

2

24

17

3

59

10

30

5

82

0

343

Carlin at 31.
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Appendix J
Membership in the Two Main City Bar Associations by Size of Firm1, 1960
Bar
Association
Association of
the Bar of the
City of New
York
New York
County
Lawyers?
Association

1

Large Firm

Medium

Small

61

36

13

Solo
Practitioner
10

27

41

50

47

Carlin at 36.
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Appendix K
Disposition of Derivative Shareholder Suits by Year 1930-19421
Year

Jurisdi
ction

Number
of Suits
(Not
Including
Consolida
ted Suits)

Percenta
ge of
Successf
ul Suits2

1932

First
Depart
ment
(Manh
attan/
Bronx
)

84

SDNY

14

32.14% 11.90% (10)
(21
Settleme
nts, 2
Private
Settleme
nts, 3
Nominal
Settleme
nts, and
1
Judgme
nt)
7.14%
28.57% (4)
(1)

Kings
County

0

1
2

Percentage
of AStrike
Suits@3

Percentage
Plaintiff=s
Losses
based on
Judgments
on the
Merits

Percentage
Pending,
Dormant, or
Removed
from Court

8.33% (7)

35.71% (2
Pending, 2
Removed, 4
Dormant, 2
Action
Enjoined,
20
Discontinue
d)

7.14% (1)

57.14% (2
Remanded
to Sup. Ct.
and 6
Discontinue
d)

Disposi Number
tion
of Cases
Unclear where
there was
Actual
Recovery
to
Corporati
on4
11.90% 1.19%
(10)
(1)

0.00%
(0)

0.00%
(0)

From Wood Report Appendix.
Successful suits include judgments in favor of the plaintiff and settlements.

3

Strike Suit here is defined as suits that did not for whatever reason go beyond a dismissal or
summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
4

Some settlements and judgments were nominal pittances while others were rather monumental
victories for the plaintiffs (in the millions of dollars).
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1933

1934

First
Depart
ment
(Manh
attan/
Bronx
)

145

SDNY

7

Kings
Count
y
First
Depart
ment
(Manh
attan/
Bronx
)

0

77

27.59%
(31
Settleme
nts, 3
Private
Settleme
nts, 2
Nominal
Settleme
nts, 3
Judgme
nts, and
1
Settleme
nt After
Judgme
nt)
14.29%
(1
Settleme
nt)

10.34% (13,
1
Consensual
Dismissal,
and 1
Consensual
Dismissal
on the
Merits)

7.59% (11)

24.14% (1
Dormant, 5
Removed,
and 29
Discontinue
d)

30.34%
(44)

5.52%
(8)

0.00% (0)

0.00% (0)

85.71% (1
Remand to
Sup. Ct. and
5
Discontinue
d)

0.00%
(0)

14.29%
(1)

22.08%
(15
Settleme
nts, 1
Nominal
Settleme
nt 1
Judgme
nt but
Defenda
nt was
Judgme
nt
Proof)
Note
that one
settleme

10.39% (7
and 1 was
because
Def. was in
Bankruptcy
Court)

11.69% (8
Judgments
and 1
Reversal)

29.87% (1
Pending, 1
Dormant, 3
Transferred,
and 18
Discontinue
d)

25.97%
(20)

1.30%
(1)
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1935

1936

SDNY

6

Kings
Count
y
First
Depart
ment
(Manh
attan/
Bronx
)

0

SDNY

10

Kings
Count
y
First
Depart
ment
(Manh
attan/
Bronx
)

0

SDNY

9

139

82

nt
disposed
of the
BOD.
50.00% 33.33% (2)
(3
Settleme
nts)

33.09%
(40
Settleme
nts, 4
Nominal
Settleme
nts, and
2
Judgme
nts)
0.00%
(0)

0.00% (0)

16.67% (1
Discontinue
d)

0.00%
(0)

0.00%
(0)

10.79% (14
and 1 by
Consent)

4.32% (6)

37.41% (1
Pending, 6
Removed, 1
Transferred,
8 Dormant,
and 36
Discontinue
d)

14.39%
(20)

15.79%
(3)

10.00% (1
Comp.
Dismissed)

0.00% (0)

90.00% (1
Remand to
Sup. Ct. and
8
Discontinue
d)

0.00%
(0)

0.00%
(0)

6.10% (5)

43.90% (1
Pending, 1
Dormant,
10
Removed,
and 24
Discontinue
d)

9.76%
(8)

2.44%
(2)

11.11% (1)

0.00% (0)

0.00%
(0)

11.11%
(1)

25.61% 14.63% (12)
(19
Settleme
nts, 1
Judgme
nt, and 1
Settleme
nt After
Judgme
nt)
33.33% 55.55% (5)
(3
81

Settleme
nts)

1937

1938

Kings
Count
y
First
Depart
ment
(Manh
attan/
Bronx
)

0

SDNY

11

Kings
Count
y
First
Depart
ment
(Manh
attan/
Bronx
)

0

SDNY

14

73

101

28.77% 16.44% (12)
(18
Settleme
nts, 1
Nominal
Settleme
nt, and 2
Judgme
nts)
27.27% 18.18% (2)
(2
Settleme
nts, 1
Judgme
nt)

15.07% (11)

28.77% (3
Dormant, 2
Removed,
and 16
Discontinue
d)

10.96%
(8)

2.74%
(2)

9.09% (1)

45.45% (1
Removed,
and 4
Discontinue
d)

0.00%
(0)

0.00%
(0)

29.70% 9.90% (10)
(22
Settleme
nts, 3
Nominal
Settleme
nts, 1
Settleme
nt after
Judgme
nt for
Plaintiff,
4
Judgme
nts)
35.71% 14.29% (2)
(4
Settleme
nts and
1

10.89% (11)

31.68% (2
Pending, 2
Removed or
Transferred,
25
Discontinue
d, and 3
Dormant)

17.82% 5.94%
(15 and (6)
3
Supers
eded by
Rec.
Action)

0.00% (0)

50.00% (2
Removed or
Remanded,
5
Discontinue

0.00%
(0)

82

7.14%
(1)

1939

1940

Judgme
nt)
26.67% 6.67% (2)
(7
Settleme
nts and
1
Judgme
nt)
17.98% 20.22% (18)
(9
Settleme
nts, 1
Nominal
Settleme
nt, and 6
Judgme
nts)

d)

Kings
Count
y

30

First
Depart
ment
(Manh
attan/
Bronx
)

89

SDNY

16

6.25%
62.50% (10)
(1
Settleme
nt)

12.50% (2)

Kings
Count
y

14

28.57%
(4
Judgme
nts)

0.00% (0)

First
Depart
ment
(Manh
attan/
Bronx
)

132

29.55%
(32
Settleme
nts, 1
Settled
Nominal
ly, and 6
Judgme

28.57% (3
and 1
Motion to
examine
denied)
9.85% (13)

83

10.00% (3)

12.36% (10
and 1 on
Consent)

12.12% (16)

26.67% (1
Pending, 2
Dormant, 1
to Referee
and 4
Discontinue
d)
39.33% (4
Pending, 4
Removed,
23
Discontinue
d, 2
Dormant
and 1
Vacated
Service and
1 Dismissed
as to 3
defendants
and dormant
as to others.
18.75% (1
Pending, 1
Removed
and 1
Discontinue
d)
28.57% (1
Pending 1
Removed, 2
Discontinue
d)
28.03% (10
Pending and
27
Discontinue
d)

30.00%
(9)

3.33%
(1)

10.11%
(8 and
1 for
Apprai
sal)

4.49% (3
Payments
and 1
Failed
Payment)

0.00%
(0)

0.00%
(0)

14.29%
(2)

0.00%
(0)

20.45%
(27)

3.03%
(4)

1941

1942

SDNY

10

Kings
Count
y

17

First
Depart
ment
(Manh
attan/
Bronx
)
SDNY

75

Kings
Count
y

37

First
Depart
ment
(Manh
attan/
Bronx
)
SDNY

92

Kings

26

13

14

nts)
20.0%
40.0% (4)
(1
Settleme
nt and 1
Judgme
nt)
5.88%
11.76% (2)
(1)

16.0%
(7
Settleme
nts and
5
Judgme
nts
7.69%
(1
Settleme
nt)
27.03%
(9
Settleme
nts and
1
Judgme
nt)
17.31%
(16
Settleme
nts and
2
Judgme
nts)
6.67%
(1
Settleme
nt)
11.54%

10.0% (1)

20.0% (2)

10.0%
(1)

0.00%
(0)

11.76% (2)

29.41% (1
Pending and
4
Discontinue
d)
27.0% (13
Pending +
14
Discontinue
d)

41.18%
(7)

0.00%
(0)

16.0%
(12)

9.33%
(7)

21.33% (16)

10.66% (8)

61.54% (8)
(1 for no
Juris.)

7.69% (1)

23.08% (2
Pending)

0.00%
(0)

0.00%
(0)

10.81% (4)

5.40% (2)

21.62% (8)

35.14%
(13)

0.00%
(0)

19.23% (20)

7.69% (8)

16.35% (17)

27.88%
(29)

1.92%
(2)

33.33% (5)
(Two b/c
Lack of
Juris.)
11.54% (3)

13.33% (2)

40.00% (6)

7.69% (2)

23.08% (6)

84

0% (0)

42.31%

3.85%

Count
y

(3
Settleme
nts)

(11)

85

(1)

Appendix L
Main Area of Practice by Size of Firm1, 1960
Main Area of
Practice
Business
Probate
Real Estate
Personal Injury
Criminal,
Matrimonial,
and Worker?s
Comp
No Answer
Total

1

Large Firm

Medium Firm

Small Firm

Solo Practice

68%
23%
5%
2%
2%

66%
20%
2%
6%
4%

27%
17%
18%
26%
11%

36%
15%
17%
22%
9%

0%
100% (60
Reporting)

2%
100% (204
Reporting)

1%
100% (161
Reporting)

1%
100% (376
Reporting)

Carlin at 25.
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Appendix M
Individual Clients Mainly Jewish1, 1960

Individual
Clients Mainly
Jewish

1

Large Firm (15+)
14%

Medium (5-14)
34%

Carlin at 24.

87

Small (2-4)
46%

Solo Practice
44%

Net Income Per Family1 2

United States
(Median)6

1944

In 2002
Dollars3

20014

In 2002
Dollars5

2,533

25,876.90

43,388.63

44,050.31

1

There are two forms of determining the Aaverage@ income. The first is the per capita income which is
simply the total income of all persons in the area divided by the number of individuals or families in the same area.
The second is simply taking the median income which is a function of the highest and lowest incomes. Median is
that number that divides the group into two equal parts. See Statistical Abstract of the United States (1949 at 12).
For any income table, usage of mean (per capita) and median are mutually exclusive.
2

The average number of people in families has fluctuated. These statistics use an average
number of
people per family. In 1944, this number was 3.54. Historical Statistics of the United States (Dept. of
Commerce 1960 at 166).
3

Multiplier Based on U.S. Department of Labor online inflation adjuster found at
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm#data. The multiplier was about 10.21591 from 1944 to 2002.
4

From Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2001 (Dept. of Commerce 2001 at 436).
Household Income from 1999. Adjusted to 2001 dollars by using Multiplier Based on U.S. Department of
Labor online inflation adjuster found at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm#data. The multiplier was about
1.06303 from 1999 to 2001.
5

Adjusted to 2002 dollars by using Multiplier Based on U.S. Department of Labor online inflation
adjuster found at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm#data. The multiplier was about 1.01525 from 2001 to
2002.
6

Statistical Abstract of the United States (1949 at 290).
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New York

M: 2,369.367

M: 22,399.61

W: 1,260.11

W: 12,873.15

42,582.86

43,232.25

Net Income Per Individual

19461

In 2002
Dollars2

20013

In 20024
Dollars

United States

1,213

24,205.17

30,520.58

30,986.02

New York

1,651

15,223.06

35,530.21

36,072.04

7

Figures per 1950 Census, Vol. II Characteristics of the Population, Part 32, Page 32-446. The
1940 Census was the first census using net incomes, and the 1950 census was the first census using
families as economic units. The 1950 census numbers here use 1949 estimates of net incomes for
persons (males and females separately) as heads of families. Of course, this information fails to adjust
for families that have two incomes while commonplace today was still rare in the late 1940s. Figures
found were adjusted downward by using U.S. Department of Labor online inflation adjuster found at
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm#data. The multiplier was about 0.73950 from 1949 to 1944.
1

Per Capita is Based on Closest Year (1946).

2

Multiplier Based on U.S. Department of Labor online inflation adjuster found at
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm#data. The multiplier was about 9.22051 from 1946 to 2002.
3

From Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2001 (Dept. of Commerce 2001 at 426). Net
Income from 2000. Adjusted to 2001 dollars by using Multiplier Based on U.S. Department of Labor online
inflation adjuster found at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm#data. The multiplier was about 1.02846 from
2000 to 2001.
4

Adjusted to 2001 dollars by using Multiplier Based on U.S. Department of Labor online inflation
adjuster found at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm#data. The multiplier was about 9.22051 from 2001 to
2002.
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